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Preying on the Graying: A Statutory 
Presumption to Prosecute Elder Financial 
Exploitation 
Andrew Jay McClurg 
With seventy-eight million baby boomers in or nearing retirement, elder financial 
exploitation has been labeled the “Crime of the 21st Century,” yet little has been 
done to address the problem. While states and the federal government have passed 
hundreds of laws protecting children based on the assumption they are vulnerable 
and unable to protect themselves, older at-risk adults have been comparatively 
ignored despite extensive research showing they too are vulnerable. 
A substantial roadblock to prosecuting elder financial predators is the inability to prove 
that the financial transfers at issue were the result of exploitation rather than legitimate 
transactions. Many victims “voluntarily” part with their assets. To outsiders, the transfers 
may look like gifts or loans when in fact they occur because of undue influence, 
psychological manipulation, and misrepresentation. Even when property is taken by 
stealth, the incapacity or death of the victim often precludes prosecutors from being able 
to prove that the transfers were not legitimate. 
This Article proposes the adoption of state criminal statutes that create a permissive 
presumption of exploitation with regard to certain financial transfers from elders. The 
Article offers a specific statute and explains how it would be workable and constitutional. 
Preliminarily, the Article explores the scope of elder financial exploitation, discusses why 
it is grossly underreported and under-prosecuted, and analyzes practical, cognitive, and 
psychological reasons why older adults are vulnerable, focusing on emerging research 
showing that even elders who lack obvious impairments are at risk. 
 Professor and Herbert Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, University of Memphis Cecil C. 
Humphreys School of Law. My thanks to Professors Lynda Wray Black, Donna Harkness, Barbara 
Kritchevsky, Steven J. Mulroy, and Katherine T. Schaffzin, Judge Karen Cole, research assistant 
Brittney L. Rummells, reference librarian Whitney A. Curtis, and faculty assistant Linda H. Hayes for 
their valuable help. I am especially thankful to my sister, Robin L. Taylor, for her aid and 
encouragement in pursuing this Article. We are both indebted to Detective Edward Goldbach and 
Assistant State Attorney Richard Sherman, Broward County, Florida, for investigating and 
prosecuting our father’s elder exploitation case that is described in this Article. Mr. Sherman 
graciously provided copies of court and other case documents. 
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Introduction 
A ninety-three-year-old man takes a walk in his South Florida 
neighborhood, using a cane for assistance. A year earlier he lost his wife of 
thirty-five years to cancer. He lives alone. His children live out of state. 
A thirty-eight-year-old woman approaches him near his house and 
strikes up a conversation, asking for directions to the nearest hospital. 
She suggests they meet sometime for coffee. A week later she calls him 
although the man does not recall giving the woman his phone number. 
She begins visiting him at his house, showing him attention and affection. 
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During one of these visits she tells the man she has cancer and needs 
surgery but that the hospital will not treat her unless it is paid up front 
and in full. She states that the surgery will cost approximately $15,000. 
The man begins loaning her money. She continues asking for more 
money, saying it is needed for more medical treatment. He gives it to her. 
The woman tells the man she owns an apartment building in New 
York that she is selling and will be able to pay him back when that 
transaction occurs, but refuses to provide the building address. As time 
passes she tells the man she is free of cancer but now needs money for 
her sick grandmother and son. She assures him she is a single woman and 
that the man she lives with is her brother, but official records show that 
he is her husband. The course of dealing between the young woman and 
the old man continues until, during a ten-month period, the man, who 
lives on Social Security, transfers $60,000 to her. 
The above story is common, but in this case the man was our father, 
Donald McClurg.1 The above facts were included in the probable cause 
affidavit filed in support of the complaint2 charging the exploiter with a 
second degree felony of elder exploitation to which she pled guilty in 
December 2012 and paid $50,000 in restitution.3 The affidavit concluded: 
“The lies and fictitious stories [the Defendant] continually tells Mr. 
McClurg are clearly designed to prey on his affections and loneliness for 
the sole purpose of stealing Mr. McClurg’s money. This detective, relying 
on experience and training, clearly views this incident as a classic 
‘sweetheart scam.’”4 
“Sweetheart scams”5 are particularly cruel crimes because they 
involve exploiting the known vulnerabilities of elders6 to steal not only 
1. In this Article, “our” and “we” refer to my sister, Robin Taylor, and me. Robin is a lawyer
and former prosecutor. Don’s third child, our brother Douglas, was a bankruptcy lawyer who died in a 
2002 accident. 
2. See Complaint Affidavit, Offense Rep. 33-11-1009257 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., Broward Cnty.,
June 22, 2011) (on file with Author) (setting forth these and other facts concerning the case as part of 
the Probable Cause Affidavit contained therein). 
3. See Case Summ., State of Florida v. Williams, Case No. 11010657CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., 
Broward Cnty.) (on file with Author) (showing, on an undated document, the disposition entered on 
second degree felony of elder exploitation under Fla. Stat. § 825.103(2)(b)) (on file with Author); 
Deposited Item Details, Wells Fargo Online, Dec. 4. 2012, Deposit #5931988736 (providing a copy of the 
restitution check in the amount of $50,000); Cir. Ct. Disposition Order in and for Broward Cnty., Fla., Case 
No. 11010657CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., Broward Cnty., Dec. 4., 2012) (on file with Author) (showing change 
of plea by defendant to “Guilty” and that she was adjudicated guilty on one count, incarcerated for the two 
days between her arrest and release on bail, and ordered to pay a $1500 fine and court costs). 
4. Complaint Affidavit, supra note 2. Because the purpose of including my father’s story is to
impart understanding of the issues, I have opted to refer to the perpetrator throughout this Article as 
“the Defendant” rather than by name. 
5. Legal literature regarding sweetheart scams is almost nonexistent. As of this writing, the term
“sweetheart scam” is mentioned in only four sources in Westlaw’s legal periodical database, and none 
of these sources address the term in detail. A search of the Westlaw TP-All database for “sweetheart 
scam” on March 16, 2014 turned up these four sources mentioning the term: 23 Ky. Prac. Ky. Elder 
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their financial assets, but their hearts, pride, and dignity. They are but 
one type of elder financial exploitation, which, already widespread and 
with seventy-eight million baby boomers in or nearing retirement,7 has 
been labeled the “Crime of the 21st Century.”8 
Elder financial exploitation is “underreported, under-recognized, 
and under-prosecuted.”9 Our father, Don, was one of the “lucky” victims 
in that his case was investigated and successfully prosecuted thanks to an 
aggressive detective and determined prosecutor. Most victims are not so 
fortunate.10 But he recovered only a portion of his assets in restitution11 
Law Exploitation § 15:9 (2013); Russell W. Jacobs, Copyright Fraud in the Internet Age: Copyright 
Management Information for Non-Digital Works Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
13 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 97, 148 (2011); Alex Ginsberg, Note, Hate is Enough: How New York’s 
Bias Crimes Statute Has Exceeded Its Intended Scope, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1599, 1626 n.145 (2011); Lori 
A. Stiegel, Nat’l Academy of Elder Law Att’ys, Inc., Financial Abuse: How it May Impact Your Client 
and Your Practice, 2011 NAELA Inst. 9-1 (2001). 
Reports of sweetheart scams bear eerie similarities. Compare the following general description of 
how sweetheart scams operate with the factual recitation of our father’s case: “The scam typically 
involves a woman in her late 20s to late 40s approaching a man 60 or older and striking up a friendly 
conversation, which then leads to a date . . . . She seduces him, leads him to believe a relationship is 
developing, then opens up about a financial quandary, like a medical procedure or a tuition payment.” 
Kristen Schorsch, ‘Sweethearts’ Scamming Men Out of Money, Chi. Trib. (June 9, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-09/news/ct-met-sweetheart-scams-20110609_1_sweetheart-
scams-mothers-and-daughters-older-men. 
6. There is some dispute regarding the proper terminology to use when referring to older
people. Controversy arises because of concern that some terminology perpetuates or promotes 
negative stereotypes. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings, in 
Elder Mistreatment: Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation in an Aging America 382, 382 n.1 (Nat’l 
Research Council ed., 2003). This Article uses the terms “elder,” “elderly,” and “older adults” 
interchangeably. Hafemeister noted that “elder” and “elderly” are commonly used in legislation on 
the subject of elder abuse and exploitation. Id. There has been some legislative movement in recent 
years to abandon age-related terms and include elders in the all-encompassing term “vulnerable 
adult.” See, e.g., S.B. 1222, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (proposing numerous amendments to 
Florida’s elder exploitation legislation, including substitution of the term “vulnerable adult” for 
“elderly person or disabled adult”). 
7. See U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Characteristics of Baby Boomers 42 to 60 Years Old
in 2006 at 6 (2009) (stating that the baby boom generation includes the population born between 1946 
and 1964 and that in 2006 it was estimated to include 77,980,296 people). 
8. MetLife Mature Mkt. Inst., The MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse: Crimes of
Occasion, Desperation, and Predation Against America’s Elders 5 (2011) [hereinafter MetLife 
Study of Elder Financial Abuse]. This study, a follow-up to a 2009 study, was prepared in 
collaboration with the National Committee for the Prevention of Elder Abuse and researchers at 
Virginia Tech University and the University of Kentucky. Id. at 2. 
9. Id. at 4. 
10. See infra notes 115–133 and accompanying text (discussing rarity of successful elder fraud
prosecutions). 
11. He received $50,000 in restitution. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Although the
precise amount was never determined, we estimated that he transferred approximately $90,000 to the 
Defendant. The sum is greater than the $60,000 stated in the probable cause affidavit because our 
father routinely understated the amounts and continued to transfer money to the Defendant after the 
probable cause affidavit was filed. This is a common, complicating fact pattern in elder fraud financial 
exploitation cases. See Lisa Nerenberg, Forgotten Victims of Financial Crime and Abuse: Facing the 
Challenge, J. Elder Abuse & Neglect, Aug. 2000, at 49, 51–53 (stating that one common obstacle to 
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and the incident left him psychologically and emotionally damaged. Like 
most people, I understood little of the nature or prevalence of elder 
financial exploitation until our father’s case. Dealing with his ordeal 
opened my eyes to the fact that our legal and social welfare systems are 
unequipped to adequately protect elders from predators. 
Despite substantial evidence that elder abuse and exploitation of all 
types is widespread and increasing,12 and research showing that many 
elders are susceptible to exploitation for reasons associated with aging,13 
too little is being done to address the problem. While states and the 
federal government have passed hundreds of laws protecting children 
based on the assumption that they are vulnerable and unable to protect 
themselves,14 older at-risk adults have been comparatively ignored even 
though they are vulnerable for some of the same reasons.15 The federal 
Elder Justice Act of 2010, hailed as a milestone achievement in elder 
abuse protection and prevention,16 accomplished little more than setting 
prosecuting elder financial exploitation is that suspects continue to exercise control over the victims 
while the investigation is ongoing with the risk that their assets will be depleted by the time the case is 
prosecuted). 
12. See infra notes 32–33, 107–110 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 41–106 and accompanying text. 
14. See Gary A. Debele, Custody and Parenting by Persons Other Than Biological Parents: When
Non-Traditional Family Law Collides with the Constitution, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 1227, 1245 (2007) (quoting 
social critic Neil Postman in discussing the fact that beginning in the 1850s, hundreds of laws were passed 
to protect children based on the assumption that they are “qualitatively different from adults”); see also 
James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to 
Unfit Parents, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 407, 409 (2008) (stating that since the mid-1990s, Congress has passed 
several laws designed to protect children); Nicole A. Saharsky, Note, Consistency as a Constitutional 
Value: A Comparative Look at Age in Abortion and Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1119, 
1120–21 (2001) (stating that many laws have been passed to protect children and listing examples). 
15. See Nina A. Kohn, Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach Elder
Protection Systems, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 175, 176 (2003) (asserting that the United States has much 
more comprehensive systems for addressing child mistreatment than for addressing elder mistreatment, 
that many factors related to child mistreatment are also present in elder mistreatment, and that 
policymakers should look to child protection systems to enhance elder protection). This is not to equate 
children and older adults, which would be insulting to older adults, but research shows that the two 
groups are vulnerable for some of the same reasons in terms of cognitive functioning. For example, 
research has shown similarities between young children and elders in problem solving, memory encoding, 
and retrieval abilities. See Deborah Roedder John & Catherine A. Cole, Age Differences in Information 
Processing: Understanding Deficits in Young and Elderly Consumers, 13 J. Consumer Res. 297, 298 (1986) 
(discussing problem solving); id. at 299–399 (discussing memory). 
16. See, e.g., Strengthening our Commitment to Minnesota Seniors: Promoting Independent Living
Through the Older Americans Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 
111th Cong. 39 (2010) (statement of Iris C. Freeman, Associate Director, Center for Elder Justice & 
Policy, William Mitchell College of Law) (“Passage of the Elder Justice Act was a great milestone.”); 
The 2010 Retrospective: An Eventful Year, Nat’l Ctr. on Elder Abuse E-news, Dec. 2010, at 1 
(characterizing the Elder Justice Act as “a tremendous milestone in terms of public policy regarding 
elder mistreatment”). 
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up councils and advisory boards to study and report on the problem.17 It 
is a good step, but the law has no teeth.18 
Much needs to be done to prevent and disrupt elder financial 
exploitation.19 This Article focuses on making it easier to successfully 
prosecute offenders, both to assure justice to individual victims and 
provide a deterrent to abuse. As discussed herein, elder exploiters commit 
their crimes in part because they accurately view the chances of being 
detected and successfully prosecuted as minimal.20 
By their nature, elder exploitation cases do not involve situations in 
which perpetrators conk their victims on the head and steal their wallets. 
Many victims are tricked or deceived into “voluntarily” parting with their 
assets. To outsiders, the transfers may look like gifts or loans, when in 
fact they occur because of undue influence, psychological manipulation, 
and misrepresentation. Even when property is taken by stealth, the 
incapacity or death of the victim often prevents prosecutors from being 
able to prove that the transfers were the result of theft or exploitation. 
Researchers and commentators agree that this is one of the primary 
hindrances to prosecution: the inability of prosecutors to prove that the 
17. The Elder Justice Act of 2010 was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The 
Act established an Elder Justice Coordinating Council (“Council”), comprising the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the heads of governmental 
entities with responsibilities related to elder mistreatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1397k(a)–(b) (2010). The 
Council will meet twice a year and make recommendations regarding the coordination of activities of 
federal, state, local, and private agencies and entities relating to elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation. 
Id. § 1397k(e)–(f)(1). Every two years, the Council is to submit a report describing the activities of the 
Council and make recommendations for legislation. Id. § 1397k(f)(2). 
The Act also established the Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation (the 
“Advisory Board”) to develop multidisciplinary strategic plans regarding elder justice and make 
recommendations to the Council. Id. § 1397k-1(a). The Advisory Board is required to prepare annual 
reports and make recommendations regarding elder justice programs, modifications in laws and 
regulations, and effective methods for collecting national data regarding elder justice and 
mistreatment. Id. § 1397k-1(f)(3). The Act calls for federal grants to eligible entities, including states, 
for a variety of purposes related to studying and preventing elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Id. 
§§ 1397l(a)–1397m-1(c). It also calls for the establishment of a National Training Institute for federal 
and state surveyors to provide training to surveyors to investigate mistreatment of elders in long term 
care facilities. Id. § 1395i-3a(1)(A). 
18. A subsequent federal act called the Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2011 died in the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees. S. 462, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2564, 112th Cong. (2011). While these 
bills also lacked enforcement provisions, they were aimed directly at aiding states in identifying and 
prosecuting elder abusers and exploiters. The goal of the act was to encourage states to create jobs 
designed to hold those who abuse or exploit elders accountable and promote better research and data 
collection regarding elder abuse and exploitation to ensure greater efficacy and efficiency in attacking 
the problem. The House bill was reintroduced in 2013. H.R. 861, 113th Cong. (2013). GovTrack gave it 
a seven percent chance of making it out of committee and a two percent chance of being enacted. 
H.R. 861: Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2013, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr861 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
19. See infra notes 258–265 and accompanying text (discussing some preventative measures). 
20. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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financial transfers at issue were the fruits of exploitation rather than gifts, 
loans, or other legitimate transactions.21 Speaking in the context of 
sweetheart scams, one fraud investigator identified the problem as “the 
dirty word called CONSENT.”22 Proving exploitation in any type of elder 
fraud case is complicated because the transactions usually occur in secret 
and victims may make poor witnesses due to cognitive or other 
impairments, or because they refuse to cooperate with authorities.23 
This Article proposes the adoption of state criminal statutes that 
create a permissive presumption of exploitation with regard to certain 
financial conveyances from elders to non-relatives.24 It sets forth a detailed 
statute intended as a conceptual framework for states to use in fashioning 
a permissive presumption statute that fits within their existing elder 
protection legislative schemes. The Article includes references to our 
father’s case at points to add context, insights and a human face to the 
issues discussed. 
Part I explores the scope of elder financial exploitation and examines 
practical, cognitive, and psychological explanations for why older adults 
are unusually susceptible to exploitation, focusing on emerging research 
showing that even elders who lack obvious physical or cognitive 
impairments can be at risk. Part II explains why elder financial crimes are 
grossly underreported and under-prosecuted. Part III sets forth the 
proposal for the permissive presumption statute mentioned above, 
prefaced by a discussion of the need and justification for a presumption 
approach and an analysis showing the proposed presumption is 
constitutionally sound under Supreme Court authority. The Conclusion 
offers brief closing remarks. 
21. See, e.g., Kendon J. Conrad et al., Self-Report Measure of Financial Exploitation of Older
Adults, 50 Gerontologist 758, 758–59 (“Differentiating [financial exploitation] from legitimate 
transactions is challenging in that there may be indications of consent by the older adult, for example, 
a signed document and an apparent gift, when in fact the perpetrator has used psychological 
manipulation or misrepresentation.”); Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the 
Solution a Problem?, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 267, 291 (2003) [hereinafter Dessin, Is the Solution a 
Problem?] (stating “the lack of consent issue” is often “central in an exploitation case”); Hafemeister, 
supra note 6, at 420–21 (“Evaluating whether financial abuse occurred often requires complex and 
subjective determinations to distinguish between acceptable transactions and exploitative conduct and 
separate misconduct from mismanagement.”). 
22. Sweetheart Swindles, FraudTech, http://www.fraudtech.org/sweetheart_scam.htm (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014). Fraudtech.org is an anti-fraud website written by retired law enforcement officer 
Dennis Marlock. FraudTech’s World of Cons, Frauds and Other Lies, FraudTech, 
http://www.fraudtech.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (describing author’s background as a detective in 
the Milwaukee Police Department). 
23. See infra notes 45–46, 117–121, 130–132 and accompanying text. 
24. Unfortunately, a significant percentage of elder fraud exploitation occurs at the hands of
relatives. See infra text accompanying note 33. Exploitation by relatives would not be addressed by my 
proposal because, as explained in Part III, a presumption statute intended to apply to relatives most 
likely would fail to pass constitutional muster. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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I.  The Scope of Elder Financial Exploitation and Reasons 
Elders Are Vulnerable 
“It is an article of faith in this business to go after the old 
folks.”25 
Elder financial exploitation is defined broadly as “the illegal or 
improper use of an elder’s funds, property, or assets.”26 The 2010 Elder 
Justice Act defines it as “the fraudulent or otherwise illegal, unauthorized, 
or improper act or process of . . . us[ing] the resources of an older 
individual for monetary or personal benefit, profit, or gain, or that results 
in depriving an elder of rightful access to, or use of, benefits, resources, 
belongings, or assets.”27 All states now have laws addressing the abuse and 
exploitation of the elderly.28 Many state statutes specifically protect elders, 
while some encompass the broader category of “vulnerable adults.”29 The 
state statutes incorporate similar themes but vary widely in their 
language.30 
Although the true scope of elder financial exploitation is unknown 
due to underreporting,31 a 2011 study by the MetLife Mature Market 
Institute, in conjunction with non-profit and educational partners, 
estimated the annual loss by victims to be at least $2.9 billion, a 12% 
25. Eun-Jin Kim & Loren Geistfeld, What Makes Older Adults Vulnerable to Exploitation or
Abuse?, 13 Forum for Family & Consumer Issues, no. 1, Spring 2008, available at http://ncsu.edu/ 
ffci/publications/2008/v13-n1-2008-spring/Kim-Geistfeld.php (quoting self-identified elder con artist). 
26. Nat’l Ctr. on Elder Abuse, Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass’n, The National Elder Abuse
Incidence Study: Final Report 3-3 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study]. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1397(j)(8) (2010). 
28. 50 State Statutory Surveys: Family Law: Adult Care, Physical and Financial Abuse of
the Elderly, 0080 Surveys 1 (West 2012) (citing to statutes of all fifty states). 
29. Id. (noting this differentiation). 
30. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 825.103 (2013) (defining elder exploitation as knowingly obtaining by
deception or intimidation an elderly person’s assets with the intent to deprive the elderly person of the 
assets by a person in a position of trust with the elderly person, or who has a business relationship with 
the elderly person, or who knows or reasonably should know that the elderly person lacks the capacity 
to consent, or who breaches a fiduciary duty to an elderly person); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 473(6)(g) 
(McKinney 2013) (defining financial exploitation of adults unable to protect themselves as the 
improper use of such an adult’s funds or other property by fraud, false pretenses, embezzlement, 
conspiracy, forgery, falsifying records, or coerced property transfers or denial of access to assets); Tex. 
Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 48.002(a)(3) (West 2013) (defining elder exploitation as the illegal or 
improper act of an individual who has an ongoing relationship with an elderly person that involves 
using the resources of the elderly person for monetary or personal benefit without the informed 
consent of the elderly person); Wash. Rev. Code § 74.34.020(6) (2013) (defining financial exploitation 
of a vulnerable adult as the illegal or improper use, control over, or withholding of assets of the 
vulnerable adult by a person for any person’s or entity’s benefit other than the vulnerable adult’s); see 
also Dessin, Is the Solution a Problem?, supra note 21, at 270 (asserting that although the state statutes 
share common themes, “[i]t is virtually impossible to generalize a definition of ‘exploitation’ from the 
various states’ definitions”). 
31. See infra notes 107–114 and accompanying text. 
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increase since 2008.32 Fifty-one percent of the incidents considered in the 
study were perpetrated by strangers, 34% by family members, friends, and 
neighbors, 12% by businesses, and 4% through Medicare/Medicaid fraud.33 
The 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study found that 48% of 
the victims of elder financial exploitation were eighty years old or older 
and an additional 28.7% were between ages seventy-five and seventy-
nine.34 Thus, more than 75% of all victims were age seventy-five or older, 
the “oldest old” as one researcher described them.35 Similarly, the 
MetLife study found that the “highest number of victims were in the 80 
to 89 age range.”36 The 2009 National Elder Mistreatment Study 
suggested that a greater percentage of elders under age seventy were 
victims of financial exploitation by strangers than those over age seventy, 
but that aspect of the study suffered from a methodological flaw because 
it asked about lifetime rather than recent experiences.37 
The MetLife study found that most victims of elder financial 
exploitation are women,38 which is consistent with other data.39 
Victimization rates have been found to be significantly higher for African 
Americans than other racial groups.40 
32. MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse, supra note 8, at 2. This estimate was arrived at
by analyzing a newsfeed collection maintained by the National Center on Elder Abuse of media 
reports of all types of elder financial abuse over a three-month period from April through June 2010. 
Id. at 7. The newsfeed analysis showed losses of $530,476,743. No amounts were included in thirty-six 
percent of the reports. Id. The $2.9 billion annual figure was obtained by assuming and extrapolating 
that unreported losses were equivalent to reported losses. Id. As with all research, studies of elder 
fraud have limitations. Readers should consult the original sources cited in this Article for explanation 
of the methodologies and limitations. 
33. Id. 
34. 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 26, at 4–13. 
35. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 394. 
36. MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse, supra note 8, at 8. 
37. In a random-digit-dialing telephone survey of persons over age sixty, the National Elder
Mistreatment Study found that 7.8% of participants aged sixty through seventy were financially 
victimized by strangers at some point in their life whereas 5.2% of participants aged seventy-one or 
older had been financially victimized by strangers. See Ron Acierno et al., The National Elder 
Mistreatment Study 57 (2009). But unlike other abuse questions in the study, which focused on past-
year experiences, the financial exploitation question asked about lifetime experiences, calling the 
finding into question. See id. at 5 (stating that survey inquiries were based on past-year prevalence, 
except for financial exploitation by non-family members, which was based on lifetime experiences). 
38. MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse, supra note 8, at 8 (finding that in 2010 there were
nearly twice as many female as male victims in media reports). Reasons for the larger number of 
female victims include the actuarial explanation that women live longer than men, women may be 
perceived by perpetrators as weaker and more vulnerable, and many elderly women may never have 
handled their own financial affairs. Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 36 Idaho L. 
Rev. 203, 221 (2000). 
39. 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 26, at 4–17 (stating that women
comprise sixty-three percent of elder financial exploitation victims although they make up only fifty-
seven percent of the elder population). 
40. Scott R. Beach, Financial Exploitation and Psychological Mistreatment Among Older Adults:
Differences Between African Americans and Non-African Americans in a Population-Based Survey, 
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A complex web of reasons explains why elders are prime targets for 
financial exploitation. Some are simple and practical, but the more difficult 
reasons, not only difficult to address but to comprehend when fashioning 
solutions, are grounded in cognition and psychology. The Subparts below 
explore all three categories,41 focusing on emerging research showing that 
even elders of seemingly normal mental capacity are vulnerable. 
A. Practical Explanations 
One simple practical explanation for elder financial exploitation is 
that older people hold most of the household wealth in this country. 
People ages sixty-five and above account for nearly $15 trillion in assets, 
seventy percent of total household net worth.42 People who own their 
own homes are said to be more likely to be exploited.43 Testifying before 
a U.S. Senate committee investigating elder financial exploitation, a 
convicted elder exploiter stated that one reason elders make good targets 
is because they “save their money more than younger people.”44 
Another practically grounded risk factor for exploitation is that 
elders are often physically and socially isolated.45 Many live alone, having 
outlived their partners and friends. Their isolation gives perpetrators free 
rein to influence them and gain access to their private affairs without 
outside scrutiny.46 A closely related psychological risk factor is that social 
and physical isolation also brings loneliness,47 which in elders is often 
50 Gerontologist 744, 756 (2010) (reporting significantly higher exploitation rates for African-
American elders than for other racial groups). 
41. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. Risk factors exist other than those described
in these Subparts. 
42. Jim Hanson, Seniors Get Fleeced Out of Billions of Dollars Every Year—And Most of It Goes
Unreported, Credit Union Mag., Nov. 2009, at 29, 29. 
43. Donna J. Rabiner et al., Financial Exploitation of Older Persons: Challenges and Opportunities to 
Identify, Prevent, and Address It in the United States, J. Aging & Soc. Pol’y, Aug. 2006, at 47, 53. 
44. Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals: Financial Predators of the Elderly: Hearing Before
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 107th Cong. 19 (May 20, 2002) (testimony by incarcerated elder 
exploiter) [hereinafter Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing]. 
45. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 393. 
46. Id. (stating that when the elder lives alone, perpetrators are shielded from scrutiny). See 
Interview by Detective Edward Goldbach with Donald McClurg, in Hollywood, Fla., at 6 (Jan. 27, 
2011) (on file with Author) (establishing that nearly all of the meetings between our father and the 
Defendant occurred in his home when only the two of them were present). 
47. See Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, at 31 (testimony by
incarcerated elder exploiter that the “[t]he main target . . . is an elderly person who lives alone” and 
that one reason elders are a “good target” is that “[t]hey are very lonely and want someone to talk to”); 
see also infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text (describing psychological vulnerability of elders due 
in part to need for affection). 
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accentuated by the recent loss of a loved one.48 With respect to the latter, 
exploiters often aim their “pitch” at known vulnerabilities of the victim.49 
From the perpetrators’ standpoint, people who victimize elders 
accurately believe they are at low risk of detection or prosecution.50 As 
explained in Part II, most incidents of elder exploitation are never 
reported or prosecuted.51 In a congressional hearing, a Senate committee 
heard testimony from a relative of an elder fraud victim in a situation in 
which the perpetrator was suspected in as many as 200 incidents.52 
Even in the unusual instances when perpetrators are detected and 
successfully prosecuted, the light penalties are an inadequate deterrent to 
repeat offenses.53 Our father’s case provides an example. It was by all 
accounts a successful elder fraud prosecution. The prosecutor said he 
never handled a case where such a high amount of restitution was paid. 
But consider the result: the Defendant appropriated an estimated 
$90,000, pled guilty to a second degree felony, and paid $50,000 in 
restitution along with a $1500 fine and court costs.54 She received no jail 
time other than the two days between her arrest and posting of bail, nor 
was she sentenced to a term of probation.55 Mild penalties in elder 
exploitation cases are grounded in the same reasons that make 
prosecutions rare to begin with: difficulties of proof due to the secretive 
48. Rabiner, supra note 43, at 49 (listing as risk factors social isolation, loneliness, and loss of a
loved one). 
49. See MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that research
shows that elder exploiters may tailor their fraud pitches to the psychological needs of the victim). In 
his initial interview with the investigating detective, our father, whose wife died shortly before the 
exploitation began, was asked: 
Q. Had you told her about your wife in any of your conversations? 
A. Oh, oh yeah. I—think I did, yes. And of course I related to the—to her situation [i.e., the 
Defendant’s claim to have cancer] having gone through a very bad experience with . . . my wife. 
Q. Mm-hm. 
A. With—with the lung cancer. It was terrible. 
Interview by Detective Edward Goldbach with Donald McClurg, supra note 46, at 6. 
50. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 393 (“[P]erpetrators assume that financial abuse of the elderly is
unlikely to result in apprehension or repercussions.”). The Defendant in our father’s case did not 
appear concerned with being successfully prosecuted. The probable cause affidavit referenced two 
other reported elder exploitation incidents that she allegedly perpetrated, for which she was never 
prosecuted. Complaint Affidavit, supra note 2 (“There are two additional police reports filed with this 
agency concerning [the Defendant] and elderly exploitation.”). 
51. See infra Part II. 
52. Witness William Blevins testified on behalf of his cousin Vaughan Blevins “and over 200 others who 
have been exploited financially by a career con man.” Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra 
note 44, at 12 (statement of William Blevins, on behalf of Vaughan Blevins, Manassas, VA). 
53. Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 53 (2000) (“The relatively light sentences that are typically
imposed on perpetrators . . . fail to deter perpetrators from re-offending.”). 
54. See supra note 3 (citing court documents containing this information). 
55. Id. 
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nature of the transactions and the incapacity or intransigence of the 
victim, which give defendants strong hands to play when plea bargaining. 
B. Cognitive Explanations 
The most significant vulnerability factor for elder abuse of all types—
the factor that commands exceptional legal treatment of elder abuse—is 
that advanced age brings with it increased cognitive impairments. Of 
course, it is important to emphasize that not all elders suffer from cognitive 
impairment. One study compared the financial decisionmaking between a 
group of “high functioning neurologically healthy” elders (average age 
eighty-two) and a group of young adults (average age twenty) and found it 
to be “remarkably similar.”56 
Nevertheless, as a general proposition, it is fair to say that 
information processing and memory abilities decline with the passage of 
time.57 One researcher administered several standardized tests designed 
to test a variety of types of reasoning to young adults and older adults, 
including making logical step progressions, unraveling codes, identifying 
and explaining similarities in objects or concepts, concept formation, and 
analyzing puzzles to determine missing pieces.58 The results showed that 
the average seventy-year-old performed a full standard deviation level 
below the average young adult.59 
Fraud perpetrators are alert to and prey on the cognitive and 
physical impairments of elders. The MetLife study found that stranger 
perpetrators target victims who show visible signs of vulnerability “such 
as handicap tags on cars, the use of a walking cane, or the display of 
confusion.”60 The study reported the typical victim was an elder “visible 
to potential perpetrators in the community through activities at banks, 
grocery stores, churches, or driving around town, and was currently 
exhibiting some noticeable signs of mild to severe cognitive or physical 
impairment.”61 
Although much has been written about the cognitive capacity of 
elders, this Article makes no attempt to thoroughly review the literature. 
Obviously, if an elder is so impaired that she does not know or 
understand what she is doing, the person will be vulnerable to predators. 
More vexing to grasp—and the focus of this Subpart—is why so many 
56.  Stephanie Kovalchik et al., Aging and Decision Making: A Comparison Between
Neurologically Healthy Elderly and Young Individuals, 58 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 79, 89 (2005). 
57. Decision Making by the Growing Elderly Population is Uncharted Territory, Sci. Daily
(Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/04/070426093412.htm (quoting University 
of Oregon Professor Ellen Peters). 
58. Timothy A. Salthouse, Effects of Aging on Reasoning, in Cambridge Handbook of Thinking
and Reasoning 589, 589–91 (K.J. Holyoak & R.G. Morrison eds., 2005). 
59. Id. at 590–91. 
60. MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse, supra note 8, at 10. 
61. Id. at 8. 
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elders become victims of financial exploitation and undue influence 
despite the lack of outwardly obvious severe cognitive impairments. 
We tend to think of mental competence as a black or white issue. 
Someone either is or is not competent. Dealing with our father’s case 
brought the realization that, as researchers recognize, there is a sliding 
scale of competency or capacity62 among older adults.63 They can be 
competent in their decisionmaking in many aspects but incompetent in 
others, often subtly so. With respect to undue influence, even qualified 
neuropsychologists administering competency exams can fail to detect or 
assess a person’s susceptibility,64 in part because undue influence is a 
legal concept, not a medical one.65 
It has been estimated that eleven percent of persons over age sixty-
five and thirty-six percent of persons over age eighty-five suffer some 
degree of dementia.66 Dementia comes in degrees: it can be overt and 
obvious or lurking but not readily apparent. Recent studies show that a 
declining memory, which makes it easier to manipulate an elder, is often 
the first precursor to dementia.67 The studies also show that persons 
suffering cognitive decline in its earliest stages may perform normally on 
mental tests68 and be written off by doctors as the “worried well” when 
they report their failing memories.69 
62. Because of the stigma attached to the term “competent,” most modern researchers use the
term “capacity” in assessing the decisionmaking capabilities of elders. Mental Capacity, Consent, and 
Undue Influence, Nat’l Comm. for the Prevention of Elder Abuse, (2003), 
http://www.preventelderabuse.org/issues/capacity.html (stating that the term “incompetent” is rarely 
used by professionals in describing diminished mental abilities and that “capacity” is the preferred 
term). 
63. James J. Lynch, Mental Capacity and the Older Adult—A Psychiatrist’s Perspective, in Rose 
Mary Bailly & Elizabeth Loewy, Financial Exploitation of the Elderly: Legal Issues, 
Prevention, Prosecution & Social Service Advocacy 10–19 (2007) (discussing in a medical 
decisionmaking context the fact that there is a sliding scale of competency among elders). 
64. Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 56 (stating that even mentally competent adults can be subject to 
undue influence and that neuropsychologists may fail to note susceptibility to undue influence in the 
course of mental status examinations). 
65. Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older
Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62B J. Gerontology: Psychol. Sci. P3, P8 (2007) 
(“Undue influence is a concept that appears in the law, but is not well defined clinically.”). 
66. Susan D.M. Kelley, Prevalent Mental Health Disorders in the Aging Population: Issues of
Comorbidity and Functional Disability, J. Rehabilitation, Apr.–June 2003, at 19, 19. Dementia has 
been defined as “a syndrome of acquired persistent decline in several realms of cognitive ability 
including memory, problems with language and math, difficulty [in] problem solving, impaired 
recognition, and disturbances in planning a sequence of activities such as going to the grocery store or 
trying to do errands.” Id. at 20. 
67. See Marilynn Marchione, Memory Decline May Be Earliest Sign of Dementia, Associated Press, 
(July 18, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/memory-decline-may-earliest-sign-dementia-172940009.html 
(discussing recent studies showing that memory decline may be the earliest sign of dementia). 
68. Id. (describing several studies showing that people with declining memory may be suffering
“subjective cognitive decline” even when they “test normal on mental ability tests”). 
69. Id. (“Doctors often regard people who complain that their memory is slipping as ‘the worried
well.’”). 
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Assessing the decisionmaking capacity of elders is an area of study 
that has come into prominence relatively recently. Researchers have 
noted that different constellations of capacity exist depending on the 
complexity of the decisionmaking involved.70 Decisionmaking is a 
multidimensional process that incorporates several components, 
including: structuring the problem requiring a decision, understanding 
relevant information, integrating that information and being able to 
rationally reason about it, and appreciating the significance of the 
information and the limits of one’s own decision skills.71 
Emerging research offers explanations as to how and why elders who 
“appear to be of sound mind and body” are at risk of being financially 
exploited due to gradual neuroanatomical changes in capacities, such as 
decisionmaking and memory functions.72 This was the most baffling aspect 
of our father’s situation. From the outside, he appeared “normal.” He 
could carry on an articulate conversation about the deficiencies in the 
Miami Heat’s game plan against the Celtics the night before, but in the 
next breath insist that the Defendant’s husband was really her brother, 
“[b]ecause she told me,” ignoring documentary evidence to the contrary.73 
One frequently cited vulnerability factor for elder financial 
exploitation is that elders are more trusting than younger people.74 
Victims often have an “irrational trust” in perpetrators of elder fraud 
exploitation.75 Exploiters of elders specifically target older adults because 
of their trusting nature.76 One unscientific explanation for this trust was 
generational, the suggestion being that older people grew up in an era 
when people were more trustworthy, but recent research suggests that 
brain mechanisms are at play. 
70. Moye & Marson, supra note 65, at P3 (explaining that some decisionmaking, such as managing
finances, requires a broad set of cognitive skills, while others require a much narrower set of skills). 
71. Melissa L. Finucane & Nancy Berman Lees, Decision-Making Competence of Older Adults:
Models and Methods 2 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.116.7585&rep=rep1&type=pdf (setting forth 
these dimensions of good decisionmaking). 
72. See Natalie L. Denburg & Lyndsay Harshman, Why So Many Seniors Get Swindled: Brain
Anomalies and Poor Decision-Making in Older Adults, in Cerebrum 2010: Emerging Ideas in Brain 
Science 123–31 (2010) (using the language quoted in text and discussing emerging research that helps 
explain why elders without obvious cognitive conditions such as dementia may still be vulnerable to 
financial exploitation due to subtle brain anomalies that affect complex decisionmaking). 
73. The Complaint Affidavit stated: “[The Defendant] tells Mr. McClurg that the male subject . . . 
residing with [the Defendant] is her brother. However, this police agency has a domestic violence 
report numbered 33-1007-122130 made by [the Defendant] in which she refers to [the man] as her 
husband.” See Complaint Affidavit, supra note 2. 
74. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 392. 
75. See Bryan J. Kemp & Laura A. Mosqueda, Elder Financial Abuse: An Evaluation Framework
and Supporting Evidence, 53 J. Am. Geriatrics Soc’y 1123, 1124 (2005). 
76. See Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, at 31 (reporting testimony 
by incarcerated elder exploiter that “[t]he reason the elderly are . . . good target[s] is because they are 
very trustworthy”). 
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One study showed that older people are less alert to cues of 
untrustworthiness than younger people. Specifically, the study showed 
that older adults were less likely to interpret an untrustworthy face as a 
potentially dishonest person.77 Researchers showed photographs of faces 
intentionally selected to look trustworthy, neutral and untrustworthy to 
young adults (mean age of twenty-three) and older adults (mean age of 
sixty-eight).78 Both groups reacted similarly to the trustworthy and neutral 
faces.79 With regard to the untrustworthy faces, however, the young adults 
reacted strongly whereas the older adults saw the faces as trustworthy and 
approachable.80 
A second related study used magnetic resonance imaging to map the 
brain activities of young adults (mean age of thirty-three) and older 
adults (mean age of sixty-six) as they viewed the facial photos and found 
that the younger adults showed activation in a portion of the brain called 
the anterior insula, while the activity in that part of the brain for the 
older adults was muted.81 Shelly E. Taylor, the lead researcher in both 
studies, wrote that the “older adults do not have as strong an anterior 
insula early-warning signal; their brains are not saying ‘be wary,’ as the 
brains of the younger adults are.”82 At this point it is unknown whether 
this weakened warning signal in elders extends beyond facial impressions 
to untrustworthiness manifested by overt behavior. 
A different study hypothesized that older adults are more vulnerable 
to fraud because of the deterioration of a part of the brain known as the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex.83 Erik Asp and colleagues set out to 
investigate the underlying brain mechanisms that cause people to be 
dubious or skeptical.84 Previous researchers had determined that aging is 
linked to a decline in functioning of the prefrontal cortex, and speculated 
that it may make older adults more vulnerable to misleading information.85 
Asp’s study was directed at the specific question of the extent to which the 
prefrontal cortex works “to prevent credulity and gullibility.”86 
Applying his “False Tagging Theory,” Asp hypothesized that 
deficiencies in the ventromedial portion of the prefrontal cortex caused by 
77. Why Older Adults Become Fraud Victims More Often, Sci. Daily (Dec. 3, 2012), 







83. Erik Asp et al., A Neuropsychological Test of Belief and Doubt: Damage to Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex Increases Credulity for Misleading Advertising, Frontiers in Neuroscience, 
July 2012, at 1, 1. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1–2. 
86. Id. 
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injury or aging would create a “doubt deficit,” causing people to be more 
credulous and more likely to believe false or deceptive information.87 The 
study involved showing deceptive advertisements to patients with 
damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex.88 The findings supported 
the hypothesis that persons suffering diminishment in that part of the brain 
are more likely to believe misleading and deceptive advertisements.89 This 
finding held true even when corrective disclaimers were attached to the 
ads.90 The researchers concluded “that vulnerability to misleading 
information, outright deception, and fraud in older persons is a specific 
result” of problems caused in the doubting process resulting from 
impairment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex through aging.91 
Another substantial contributor to vulnerability to fraud and 
exploitation among elders is memory loss.92 Memory research by Larry 
Jacoby and associates showed that elders are unusually vulnerable to 
“misinformation effect,” which occurs when false information is imparted 
to a person after an event that distorts or supplants accurate memory of 
the original event.93 Specifically, this study showed, in four experiments, 
that older adults are ten times more likely to have their accurate 
memories altered by intervening misleading information.94 
Our father’s diminishing memory made him susceptible to 
manipulation through misinformation, enabling the Defendant to spin new 
tales or new versions of old ones whenever previous stories were proved 
false. A prominent illustration of this pattern involved the various 
explanations for why she needed money. 
87. Id. at 2 (describing false tagging theory as a belief process in which ideas are initially believed
but a secondary assessment tied to the ventromedial portion of the prefrontal cortex can create doubt 
or disbelief and asserting that the theory predicts that dysfunction in that portion of the brain can 
“result in a ‘doubt deficit,’ consequences of which should be credulity and a tendency to believe 
inaccurate information”). 
88. Id. at 5–6 (describing the test process). The advertisements had all been ruled to be deceptive
by the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”). One example was an advertisement for “Legacy 
Luggage,” which the FTC ruled was deceptive because it contained the headline “Legacy brings you 
the finest American Quality luggage.” The FTC determined the advertisement was deceptive because 
the luggage was made in Mexico and only inspected in the United States. Id. at 5. 
89. Id. at 7. 
90. Id. (“[T]the pattern of credulity results was evident even when the vmPFC [ventromedial
prefrontal cortex] patients were given specific information that rebuts the misleading claim.”). 
91. Id. at 9. 
92. Larry L. Jacoby et al., Aging, Subjective Experience, and Cognitive Control: Dramatic False
Remembering by Older Adults, 134 J. Experimental Psychol. 131, 131 (2005) (“A potential 
consequence of age-related declines in memory is older adults’ greater susceptibility to scams.”). 
93. Id. Jacoby’s work builds on classic misinformation studies by Elizabeth Loftus, such as her
famous experiment in which participants viewed an automobile accident in which a stop sign appeared 
and were later asked a question implying that a yield sign was present. Id. Asked to describe the 
accident later, participants who were given the false information were much more likely to remember 
seeing a yield sign than participants in the control group who were not given the misleading 
information. Id. 
94. Id. 
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As recited in the probable cause affidavit, the Defendant’s initial 
story was that she had cancer and needed the money for medical 
treatment.95 That story kept our dad, a kind, trusting person who had lost 
his long-time wife to cancer only months earlier, on the hook for an 
extended period. When the cancer story was finally exposed as false, the 
Defendant simply switched explanations, saying that she needed money 
for her sick grandmother and son,96 and later, for a $5000 piece of sewing 
equipment that she allegedly needed for her home sewing business97 and 
an automobile.98 Whether because of accessibility bias or faulty memory 
of the original information,99 our father would always remember the later 
distorted information rather than the original events. 
C. Psychological Explanations 
It is impossible to draw a line between organic cognitive factors such 
as those described above and the psychological factors that make elders 
susceptible to exploitation. Many exploited victims may not want to 
understand what is happening to them because they have become 
dependent on the perpetrator to fulfill unmet social and psychological 
needs. 
Research by Peter A. Lichtenberg and colleagues provides new 
insights into the “psychological vulnerability”100 of elders by building on 
previous research showing that depression and poor social needs 
fulfillment in aging are associated with financial exploitation.101 
Lichtenberg cited earlier research showing that three social needs 
exist throughout life: (1) the need for affection; (2) the need for 
behavioral confirmation, defined as external affirmation that a person’s 
contributions are useful and valued; and (3) status.102 While the need for 
status decreases with age, the need for behavioral confirmation remains 
95. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
96. See id. (stating that the Defendant “eventually advises Mr. McClurg that she is free of cancer
and now needs money for her sick grandmother and son”). 
97. Interview of Donald McClurg by Detective Edward Goldbach, supra note 46, at 18–19 
(describing payment to defendant of $5,000 purportedly for a sophisticated piece of sewing equipment). 
98. The payment for the automobile occurred at the very end of the exploitation period and is not 
confirmed by any official record. 
99. There are two alternative explanations for misinformation effect on accurate memory when
misleading or false information is received between the original event and the attempt at recall: 
accessibility bias and an inability to accurately recollect the original event. Accessibility bias can occur 
when people asked about a past event answer with the first information that comes to mind. Jacoby et 
al., supra note 92, at 132. Jacoby found that the young and old are equally affected by accessibility 
bias, but that older people are at a much greater risk of misinformation effect due to their inability to 
accurately recollect the original event. Id. at 133. 
 100. See generally Peter A. Lichtenberg et al., Is Psychological Vulnerability Related to the 
Experience of Fraud in Older Adults?, 36 Clinical Gerontologist 132 (2013). 
101. Id. at 134–35. 
102. Id. 
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high, and the need for affection actually increases.103 In his study of a 
nationally representative sample of 4440 survey participants over age fifty, 
4.3% report being the victims of financial fraud, but that victimization 
prevalence jumps to 14% for those with the highest depression scores and 
lowest social needs fulfillment.104 Lichtenberg concluded that “[t]he 
combination of high depression and low social-needs fulfillment was 
associated with a 226% increase in fraud prevalence.”105 He is currently 
working on developing a model for predicting psychological vulnerability 
to elder financial exploitation.106 
In many senses, our father—strong, intelligent, college-educated, and 
extremely frugal—seemed to be a most unlikely victim for exploitation. 
We certainly thought so. But the research discussed in this Part shows 
exactly the opposite was true. In retrospect, he was a perfect victim living 
amidst a perfect storm of practical, cognitive, and psychological risk 
factors. He lived alone, owned his own home, had recently lost his 
longtime wife, showed signs of declining memory and reasoning capacity, 
and suffered depression and low social-needs fulfillment. His story is a 
cautionary tale to any person—friend, relative, or law enforcement, 
healthcare, financial services or adult protective services worker—who 
has the responsibility for or goal of protecting an elder. Anyone who 
believes their elder parent or other relative is immune to financial 
predation should think again. 
II. The Underreporting and Under-Prosecution of Elder
Financial Exploitation 
There exists “a wide consensus that elder abuse is greatly 
underreported.”107 The 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study 
concluded that “officially reported cases of abuse are only the ‘tip of the 
iceberg.’”108 The study estimated that only sixteen percent of elder abuse 
incidents of all types are reported to authorities.109 A 2009 study found 
that for every case of elder financial exploitation that gets reported to 
authorities, nearly forty-four instances are not reported.110 
103. Id. at 135. 
104. Id. at 141. 
105. Id. at 143–44. 
106. Diane C. Lade, New Study, Bill Puts Focus on Senior Fraud, Sun-Sentinel (May 26, 2013), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-26/health/fl-senior-fraud-profile-20130523_1_investment-
fraud-scams-elders (reporting the results of Lichtenberg’s study and stating that he is working on 
developing a rating scale and checklist for use by healthcare workers, law enforcement, and others for 
determining when a senior might be at risk for fraud). 
107. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 383. 
108. 1998 National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 26, at 3. 
109. Id. at 5-1. 
110. Lori A. Stiegel, An Overview of Elder Financial Exploitation, 36 Generations: J. Am. Soc’y 
on Aging 73, 74 (2012) (discussing results of 2009 New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study).  
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The reasons for such low reporting are varied. They often entail 
physical or cognitive limitations that prevent the person from realizing that 
she is a victim or make it impossible for her to self-report.111 Also common, 
however, are psychological barriers such as embarrassment,112 self-blame,113 
and accompanying denial. One writer compiled a useful capsule list of 
reasons for the underreporting of elder financial exploitation: 
[V]ictims are often unable or reluctant to tell anyone they are being 
exploited, or to seek help for the following reasons: they fail to 
recognize the exploitation or think it is too late to do anything about it: 
they are physically or cognitively impaired and cannot report it; they 
are afraid they won’t be believed; there is a stigma about being labeled 
a victim; they depend upon the perpetrator and fear the loss of that 
relationship; they are reluctant to get the perpetrator in trouble; they 
fear the perpetrator will retaliate; or they fear exposure of exploitation 
will lead to the appointment of a guardian or conservator or cause 
them to be placed in a long-term-care facility.114 
 Even when reported, successful prosecutions of elder financial 
exploitation are rare.115 Many of the same factors that explain 
underreporting also hinder prosecution.116 
Many victims suffer from cognitive or physical impairments that 
prevent them from being dependable witnesses. Prosecutors, in turn, may 
shy away from cases for fear that the victim will be a “poor witness” or 
become incapacitated or die before trial.117 Perpetrators may seek to 
capitalize on these same deficiencies. 
Here we have the nut of the whole matter. Elders are vulnerable to 
fraud in the first instance in large part because of their mental and physical 
condition.118 Those same conditions contribute to a lack of reporting of the 
crimes.119 If the crime is reported, those same characteristics make it 
difficult to successfully prosecute the offender. Because most elder 
 111. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 414 (stating that the elder victims “may not realize that abuse 
occurred” or “may . . . have an impairment that prevents them from reporting the abuse or from 
recognizing its existence”). 
 112. Id. (stating that reporting is hindered by the fact that elder financial exploitation victims “may 
be embarrassed”). 
 113. Id. (“Because victims are often induced to cooperate in their own exploitation, they may 
believe that they are fully or partially to blame for their victimization.”). 
114. Stiegel, supra note 110, at 75–76. 
 115. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 420 (“The successful prosecution of financial abuse of the 
elderly has been characterized as rare . . . with few prosecutions extending beyond the investigatory 
phase and most cases being closed due to lack of evidence.”). 
116. Rabiner et al., supra note 43, at 55. 
117. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 422 (“Prosecutors may be unwilling to pursue such cases 
because the elderly may be poor witnesses” because of cognitive impairments such as lack of memory 
and that “[p]articularly frail victims are likely to decline, become incapacitated, or die during the 
course of what are often protracted proceedings.”). 
118. See supra notes 56–99 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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financial exploitation incidents occur in secrecy and isolation,120 reliable 
testimony from the victim is often the linchpin to a successful prosecution. 
There may not be any other direct witnesses because it is common for the 
exploiter to tell the victim to keep their dealings secret.121 
Prosecuting elder fraud is also complex and time consuming, 
frequently involving unraveling and trailing numerous transactions.122 
Investigating and prosecuting elder financial crimes may require 
familiarity with several diverse areas of law, including contract law, real 
estate law, guardianship law, and mental capacity.123 The cases are often 
beyond the expertise of non-specialized law enforcement officers.124 
Nor do elder financial crimes top the list of crimes that most law 
enforcement officers have an interest in taking on. As one fraud 
investigator said with regard to sweetheart scams, “[m]ost cops would 
rather investigate a triple ax murder.”125 As complex, resource-sucking 
property crimes, they are often given low priority status.126 
Underlying much of the reluctance to prosecute is the difficulty of 
sorting out and proving that the financial transfers involved in the case 
were the result of exploitation rather than non-exploitative loans or gifts. 
This is where the consent/intent issue comes into play. As one insensitive 
criminal investigator told an elder fraud complainant, it is not a crime for 
someone to give their money away. The complainant testified before a 
U.S. Senate committee on aging regarding the obstacles he faced from law 
enforcement officials when he tried to report the financial exploitation of 
his elder cousin: 
I interviewed with Fairfax County CID [Criminal Investigation 
Division] and . . . was told [the victim] made a poor witness because of 
120. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Virginia H. Templeton & David N. Kirkman, Fraud, Vulnerability, and Aging: Case Studies, 
8 Alzheimer’s Care Today 265, 273 (2007) (stating that the scammers use a strategy called “blocking the 
exits” in which they tell victims “that it is a bad idea to mention the transaction to anyone”). 
122. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 420–21 (offering this explanation as a barrier to prosecution). 
123. Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 51; id. at 51–52 (“Proving financial crimes frequently requires 
familiarity with such diverse topics as contract law, real estate, guardianship, and mental capacity. 
Investigators and prosecutors may need to decipher civil contracts and financial documents, prove 
what victims did and did not understand (often at earlier points in time), and determine what 
defendants knew or reasonably should have known about victims’ levels of understanding. Because 
these topics are not covered in traditional law enforcement training curricula or programs, few police 
officers within local precincts, even command staff, possess this expertise. Similarly, prosecutors are 
unlikely to have received training in these areas. Those officers and prosecutors with this type of 
expertise are likely to be so inundated with cases that they are forced to prioritize those that involve a 
large number of victims and large losses. Without training, law enforcement personnel who come into 
contact with financial crimes are forced to pick up needed skills ‘on the run.’”). 
 124. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 421 (stating that investigating and prosecuting financial fraud 
requires a range of expertise that most police investigators and many prosecutors lack). 
125. Sweetheart Swindles, supra note 22. 
 126. Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 54 (asserting that property crimes are often seen as less serious than 
violent crimes and that “statistic-driven” law enforcement agencies may give them lower priority). 
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his dementia. I was reminded that [the suspect] had certain rights, 
including the right to face his accuser. My response was the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal rights and protection for everyone. 
Let’s let a judge and jury decide. I was reminded more than one [sic] 
that it wasn’t a crime for someone to ‘‘give their money away.’’ I found 
and still find this comment unsuitable and demeaning to a victim with 
diminished capacity.127 
The investigator’s comment was unfortunate, and criticized by the 
chair of the Senate committee that heard the testimony,128 but the reality is 
that distinguishing legitimate transactions from those that are the result of 
undue influence, psychological manipulation, and/or misrepresentation is 
the case-killing roadblock that elder fraud investigators face in many 
situations.129 When the victim is cognitively impaired by muddled or 
forgetful thinking, a he says/she says battle of testimony with a typically 
much younger accused is not a fair fight. 
In addition to problems resolving the consent issue stemming from 
the victim’s diminished capacity,130 many victims refuse to cooperate with 
and even work against the prosecution to protect the criminal. Their 
reactions bear a discomfiting similarity to the phenomenon in domestic 
violence cases in which victims refuse to cooperate and try to “drop the 
charges.” Most states have responded to that issue in domestic violence 
cases by passing mandatory or preferential “no-drop” statutes that 
require prosecution even when the victim does not wish to proceed, but 
similar statutes do not exist for elder exploitation cases.131 Several 
commentators have advocated applying a spousal abuse model to elder 
financial abuse.132 
As a consequence of these difficulties, friends or relatives who 
report elder financial fraud to law enforcement are often turned away, 
 127. Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, at 17–18 (statement of 
William Blevins, on behalf of Vaughan Blevins, Manassas, VA). 
 128. Id. at 47–48 (quoting the chairman of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging that heard 
Blevins’ testimony stating that “the most astounding thing that I got from your testimony, that when 
you first went to . . . the local police . . . that someone said to you, in essence, that it was not a crime for 
people to give their money away”). 
129. See supra note 21. 
 130. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 421 (explaining the difficulty of determining consent when the 
victim suffers from diminished mental capacity). 
131. See generally Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to Keep Up 
with Domestic Violence Law, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1819, 1836–39 (2011) (discussing no-drop statutes 
in domestic violence cases, including critiques of such laws). 
 132. See Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 408 (making this assertion and listing several commentators 
who have advanced the argument). But see id. at 408–09 (asserting that because the spousal abuse 
model focuses largely on physical abuse, it does not appear adequate as a comprehensive model for 
addressing elder financial abuse). 
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told that the exploitation is a “civil matter” or “family matter” that they 
must handle on their own.133 
III. A Statutory Presumption to Prosecute Elder Financial
Predators 
To help level the playing field and enhance the successful 
prosecution of elder predators, this Article proposes that states enact 
statutes that supplement their existing criminal statutes to create a 
permissive presumption that certain financial transfers from elders to 
non-relatives were the result of exploitation. The details of the proposal 
are elaborated on in Subpart C below.134 Preliminarily, this Part explains 
the need and justification for a statutory presumption approach, the 
constitutionality of such an approach, and how it would work procedurally. 
A. The Need and Justification for a Presumption Approach 
“These are difficult crimes to prosecute due to the victim frequently 
being a ‘willing’ participant.”135 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent who made the 
above statement was testifying before Congress about sweetheart scams 
of the elderly, but the statement applies more generally to other types of 
elder fraud exploitation. As previously explained,136 the difficulty in 
proving that what may superficially look like voluntary gifts or loans are 
 133. See Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, at 37 (statement of 
retired detective of the Los Angeles Police Department Elder Persons Estate Unit and current elder 
financial protective services employee) (“[M]any reporting person are automatically misinformed by 
authorities that it is a civil matter, when in fact they are hidden and silent crimes.”); Dessin, Is the 
Solution a Problem?, supra note 21, at 291 (“Many law enforcement personnel and prosecutors are . . . 
reluctant to become involved in [elder financial exploitation] cases either because of a feeling that the 
cases are better handled in the civil system or because the cases present too many hindrances to 
effective prosecution.”); Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 50 (“The lines between criminal conduct and 
‘civil matters’ are often unclear, which sometimes results in law enforcement personnel referring to the 
civil system cases involving the misuse of civil instruments—such as powers of attorney—even though 
the conduct may also be criminal.”); Sweetheart Swindles, supra note 22 (stating that many 
“prosecutors share in this belief and frequently escape having to handle the case by saying ‘it’s a civil 
matter.’ Too many victims have heard those words, and now feel they have been twice betrayed; once 
by the con artist, and then by the people who are supposed to protect them from such harm”). 
This, in fact, was the reaction I initially received upon contacting the Hollywood Police 
Department by email and phone. The response to my email query stated that “[m]any times in cases 
like these, you may need to pursue action in court to have yourself or another family member seek the 
Power of Attorney over your fathers financial matters.” Email from Lt. Frank McGarry to Author 
(Jan. 12, 2011) (on file with Author). The first law enforcement officer I spoke with by phone said 
more directly that these are often “family matters,” about which the police cannot do anything. 
Fortunately, my call was forwarded to Detective Edward Goldbach, who took on and vigorously 
pursued the case. 
134. See infra Part III.C. 
135. See Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, at 57. 
136. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
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in reality the result of exploitation is a substantial hindrance to 
prosecution.137 Exploited elders are frequently unable, and sometimes 
unwilling, to effectively assist prosecutors.138 
Hundreds of presumptions exist in American jurisprudence.139 
Several reasons have been offered for creating presumptions in the law. 
They include fairness, the desire to advance substantive policies, and the 
need for some device to resolve certain issues that could not otherwise be 
resolved due to a lack of proof.140 It is agreed, however, that the strongest 
justification for most presumptions is the probabilistic determination that 
the existence of certain facts can be inferred from other facts.141 
A presumption of elder exploitation when the statutory foundational 
facts specified in Subpart C below142—giving away large sums of money to 
relative strangers for little or no consideration—is justified on several 
grounds. In terms of fairness and access to the evidence, the course of 
dealing between the elder and accused usually takes place in private.143 
Only two people know the facts and the elder is often not available as a 
witness due to incapacity or death, or the elder will make a poor witness 
because of cognitive deficiencies such as impaired memory. As explained 
in Part II, this is a primary reason why police and prosecutors are 
reluctant to undertake such cases in the first place.144  
Related to this point, the presumption called for in this Article 
would advance the substantive policy of prosecuting and deterring elder 
financial exploitation. One reason that fraud perpetrators single out 
vulnerable older adults is because they know that the odds are in their 
favor with respect to escaping prosecution or substantial punishment.145 
Finally, and most important in terms of the rationales underlying 
presumptions in the law, when elders transfer large sums of money to 
persons they have known only a short time without receiving reciprocal 
value in goods or services, it is probable that the transfer was the result 
of exploitation.146 
137. See supra note 21 (citing several sources supporting this assertion). 
138. See supra notes 117, 130–132 and accompanying text. 
139. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 343 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013) (stating that there are 
“hundreds of recognized presumptions”). 
 140. Roger C. Park et al., Evidence Law: A Student’s Guide to the Law of Evidence as 
Applied in American Trials § 4.08 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Evidence Law] (listing these reasons). 
 141. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, § 343 (“[T]he most important consideration in the 
creation of presumptions is probability.”); Evidence Law, supra note 140, § 4.08 (“[M]ost 
presumptions are created for situations in which the presumed fact is very likely to be true.”). 
142. See infra Part III.C. 
143. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
145. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra Part III.C. 
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B. The Constitutionality and Parameters of Permissive 
Presumptions in Criminal Cases 
Several authoritative commentators have thoroughly explored the 
historical development of the constitutional requirements regarding 
burdens of proof and presumptions in criminal cases.147 No useful 
purpose would be served by retracing those developments in great detail 
here. The discussion below focuses on the doctrinal points most relevant 
to the thesis articulated in this Article. 
The prosecution, of course, bears the burden of proof in criminal 
cases. This encompasses two separate burdens that are roughly analogous 
to their civil case counterparts,148 although the necessary weight of the 
evidence varies significantly with the civil burden being a preponderance 
of the evidence and the criminal burden being beyond a reasonable 
doubt.149 Those burdens are: (1) the burden of production (also called the 
burden of going forward), which is a burden to present sufficient 
evidence from which the trial judge can conclude that reasonable jurors 
could find that there is sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby avoiding a directed verdict of 
acquittal for the defendant; and (2) the burden of persuasion, which is 
the prosecution’s ultimate burden of convincing the jury that the 
defendant is guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.150 
The proposal herein, calling for a purely permissive presumption, 
would not affect these burdens of proof. As explained below, purely 
permissive presumptions in criminal cases, provided that the presumed 
facts flow rationally from the foundational or basic facts, are constitutional, 
whereas mandatory presumptions that alter the prosecution’s burdens of 
proof are constitutionally suspect. 
 147. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law §§ 7.01–8.04 (6th ed. 2012); 
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 3.4 (5th ed. 2010); 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, 
§§ 341–49; Evidence Law, supra note 140, §§ 4.01–4.13; 21B Charles Alan Wright, Kenneth W. 
Graham, Victor James Gold & Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence, 
Presumptions § 5142 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter Fed. Prac. & Proc., Evid., Presumptions]. 
148. Fed. Prac. & Proc., Evid., Presumptions, supra note 147, § 5142. 
 149. In 1970, the Supreme Court squarely held for the first time that “the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) 
(invalidating a New York criminal statute that allowed juveniles to be convicted based on a 
preponderance of the evidence). Earlier Supreme Court cases had assumed that “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” was the necessary burden without expressly holding that it was required by the Due Process 
Clause. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (stating that the margin of erroneous 
decisionmaking is reduced in criminal cases by placing the burden on the government to show guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
150. See generally Evidence Law, supra note 140, § 4.02 (distinguishing and summarizing the 
burden of production and burden of persuasion). 
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In County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen,151 the leading 
relevant case, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
New York statutory presumption that a firearm found in a vehicle is 
jointly possessed by all of the occupants, subject to certain exceptions 
enumerated in the statute.152 Three adult males and a sixteen-year-old 
girl riding in a vehicle were charged with possessing two handguns found 
in an open handbag belonging to the girl during a traffic stop.153 All four 
occupants were convicted.154 On appeal, the three males challenged the 
constitutional validity of the statute, arguing that without the statutory 
presumption, there was insufficient evidence to convict them.155 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared the statute 
unconstitutional on its face on the basis that the presumption was arbitrary 
in that it could be applied unfairly, for example, to a hitchhiker in a car 
found to contain a weapon.156 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that “[i]nferences 
and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding.”157 
The Court wrote that the value and constitutional validity of an inference-
drawing or presumption device under the Due Process Clause depends on 
two considerations: first, the strength of the connection between the 
“basic” and presumed facts that go to essential elements of the offense;158 
and second, the degree to which the device impinges on the fact finder’s 
freedom to independently assess the evidence.159 In the end, the ultimate 
restriction on the use of presumptions is that they not undermine the fact 
finder’s duty to find facts establishing each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.160 
151. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
152. Id. at 142–43. 
153. Id. at 143. 
154. Id. at 144. 
155. Id. at 145. 
156. Id. at 146, 155, 156 n.15. 
157. Id. at 156. 
158. The value and constitutional validity of inference-drawing or presumption devices “vary from 
case to case . . . depending on the strength of the connection between the particular basic and 
elemental facts involved.” Id. The facts giving rise to a presumption are usually referred to as the 
“basic” facts and that terminology is used frequently in this Article, along with “foundational facts.” 
The Court in Allen referred to presumed facts as “elemental” facts—that is, facts going to the elements 
of a crime. This Article uses that term occasionally, but for clarity, usually speaks in terms of the 
“presumed facts.” 
 159. The value and constitutional validity of inference-drawing or presumption devices depend on 
“the degree to which the device curtails the factfinder’s freedom to assess the evidence 
independently.” Id. 
 160. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). For a discussion of In re Winship, see 
supra note 149. 
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The Court indicated that permissive presumptions,161 which allow but 
do not require the fact finder to infer elemental facts and place no burden 
on the defendant, do not violate due process because such mechanisms do 
not relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.162 The only requirement is that the basic facts 
bear a rational connection to the presumed facts.163 
The “rational connection” test originated in Tot v. United States,164 
where the Court wrote that “a statutory presumption cannot be sustained 
if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the 
ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the 
other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in 
common experience.”165 Tot involved a federal statute that made it a 
crime for a fugitive or person who had been convicted of a violent crime 
to receive a firearm in interstate commerce. The statute specified that 
possession of a firearm by any such person was presumptive evidence 
that the firearm was received in interstate commerce.166 The Court 
invalidated the presumption, finding no rational connection between the 
basic fact (possessing a firearm) and the presumed fact (that it was 
received through interstate commerce).167 Crucially, a later case, Leary v. 
United States,168 indicated the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the 
rational connection test and support the existence of a presumed fact in a 
criminal case is a preponderance or “more likely than not” standard.169 
While Allen endorsed permissive presumptions, it added that 
mandatory presumptions are “far more troublesome”170 in terms of their 
constitutionality because they may excuse the prosecution from bearing its 
constitutional burden of proving the elemental facts necessary to support a 
 161. The Allen Court has been criticized for using the term “permissive presumption.” See 
Michael H. Graham, 2 Handbook of Federal Evidence § 303.4 (7th ed. 2012) (stating the Court 
created the term “out of whole cloth”). Because the presumption is purely permissive and shifts no 
burden of either production or persuasion to the defendant, it has been argued that the “permissive 
presumption” is merely a “permissive inference.” Id. Graham suggests “instructed factual inference” 
as a better term. Id. While the criticism is well-taken and has been made by others, to avoid confusion, 
this Article generally uses the term “permissive presumption” in accordance with Allen. 
162. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157. 
163. Id. 
164. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
165. Id. at 467–68. 
166. Id. at 464, 466. 
167. Id. at 468. The parties had argued and the government stipulated that the statute applied only 
to the receipt of a firearm in an interstate transaction and did not apply to firearms that had at some 
previous time traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 466. 
 168. 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a presumption that possession of marijuana 
establishes knowledge of its illegal importation). 
 169. A statutory presumption in a criminal case will be regarded as “‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and 
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact 
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Id. at 36. 
170. Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty., N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). 
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conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.171 The Court explained that 
mandatory presumptions include both presumptions that shift the burden 
of production and those that shift the ultimate burden of persuasion.172 
The Court did not expressly state that mandatory presumptions in criminal 
cases are unconstitutional, but later cases have indicated that they are if 
they shift the burden of persuasion. 
In Francis v. Franklin,173 the Court found error in a murder case jury 
instruction stating that persons of sound mind are presumed to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of their acts because the jury could 
have understood the instruction as creating a mandatory presumption that 
shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove lack of intent.174 
In rejecting the presumption, the Court used language suggesting that 
any mandatory presumption shifting the burden of persuasion violates 
due process.175 
On the other hand, presumptions shifting only the burden of 
production, even if mandatory, may be constitutional depending on their 
application to the facts of a particular case, particularly the strength of 
the connection between the basic facts and the presumed facts. The Allen 
Court did not rule on this issue, but suggested that a mandatory 
presumption that imposes “an extremely low burden of production” that 
can be satisfied by the defendant producing “‘any’ evidence” may have no 
greater impact than a permissive presumption “and it may be proper to 
analyze it as such.”176 
In Sandstrom v. Montana,177 the Court declined to the address the 
issue in a case where the defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide 
at a trial in which the jury was instructed that “[t]he law presumes that a 
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.”178 The 
defendant challenged the instruction, arguing that it unconstitutionally 
shifted the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge to the 
defendant.179 The state asserted that even if the presumption was viewed 
as mandatory (which the state disputed), it did not conclusively establish 
171. Id. at 157–59. 
172. Id. at 157 n.16. 
173. 471 U.S. 307 (1985). 
174. Id. at 325. 
175. Id. at 317 (“Our cases make clear that ‘[s]uch shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect 
to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed is 
impermissible under the Due Process Clause.’”) (quoting Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)). 
But see 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, § 347 (suggesting that a mandatory presumption 
shifting the burden of persuasion might pass constitutional muster if rational jurors could find the 
presumed facts established beyond a reasonable doubt from the basic facts). 
176. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16. 
177. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
178. Id. at 512. 
179. Id. at 513. 
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intent; rather, the presumption could be rebutted on a showing of 
“some” contrary evidence.180 
In other words, the state asserted that the presumption shifted only 
the burden of production and not the burden of persuasion. The Court 
declined to review the argument on the basis that the jury instruction 
created a risk that jurors could construe the presumption as conclusively 
establishing intent.181 Some lower federal courts have permitted 
presumptions in criminal cases that shift only the burden of production.182 
In general, commentators agree that the extent to which any type of 
statutory mandatory presumptions in criminal cases are constitutional 
remains unsettled.183 
To minimize constitutional concerns, the presumption called for in 
this Article would be purely permissive, shifting neither the burden of 
production nor the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Rather, the 
jury would be told only that it may presume the fact of elder financial 
exploitation from the basic facts enumerated in the statutory proposal.184 
Allen indicated that in criminal cases involving presumptions, the 
jury instructions will be pivotal in determining what type of inference or 
presumption is applicable.185 It was the trial judge’s jury instruction in 
Allen that saved the convictions. The Court explained that those 
instructions made 
it clear that the presumption was merely a part of the prosecution’s 
case, that it gave rise to a permissive inference available only in certain 
circumstances, rather than a mandatory conclusion of possession, and 
that it could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative 
proof offered by defendants in rebuttal.186  
The trial judge also elaborated on the essential requirement that, when 
all is said and done, the jury must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.187 Finding the connection between the 
statutory presumption of joint possession of the firearms and the facts of 
180. Id. at 515. 
181. Id. at 515–16. 
182. Post-Allen, lower federal court cases “seem to make it clear that a presumption that clearly 
shifts nothing other than the burden of production will be scrutinized in the same way as a permissive 
presumption and pass constitutional muster if it meets a rational connection test.” 2 McCormick on 
Evidence, supra note 139, § 347; see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.3 (explicitly refraining 
from deciding whether a mandatory presumption that shifts only the burden of production comports 
with due process). 
 183. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 147, § 3.4(c) (concluding that the constitutionality of statutory 
mandatory rebuttable presumptions is not clear after an analysis of relevant case law). 
184. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty., N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 n.16 (1979); see also 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979) (stating in a post-Allen presumption case that 
determining the nature of a presumption at issue “requires careful attention to the words actually 
spoken to the jury”). 
186. Allen, 442 U.S. at 160–61. 
187. Id. at 162. 
May 2014] PREYING ON THE GRAYING 1127 
the case to be “entirely rational,”188 the Court rejected the respondents’ 
arguments and upheld the convictions. 
Important to the proposal in this Article, the Court made it clear 
that presumptions are to be evaluated not in isolation, but in relation to 
all of the evidence in the case.189 In other words, the required rational 
connection between the basic fact (in Allen, a gun found in a vehicle) and 
the presumed fact (joint possession by all occupants) can be established 
and strengthened by considering all of the relevant facts and logical 
inferences to be drawn from them. Also important, the Court reaffirmed 
the Leary position that for permissive presumptions, it is only necessary 
that the basic facts support the presumed fact by a more likely than not 
standard.190 Because the jury is free to reject the inference, it is not 
necessary that the basic facts prove the presumed fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt.191 In Allen, the majority concluded that the totality of 
the facts proved by the prosecution showed “more likely than not” the 
existence of the presumed fact of joint possession of the firearms by all 
occupants of the vehicle.192 
One point that has not been definitively resolved is the quantum of 
proof required for the basic facts supporting the presumption. It has been 
suggested that a more probable than not standard should apply in theory, 
but that since in the majority of criminal cases the basic facts will 
themselves be “elemental facts”—facts necessary to support an element 
of the crime—such facts would independently be subject to the 
requirement that they be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.193 Where 
the basic facts are not elemental, it would be proper to instruct the jury 
in terms of a preponderance of the evidence standard.194 Although state 
definitions of elder exploitation vary, it is inevitable that at least some of 
the basic facts in the statutory proposal below would be elemental. To 
minimize constitutional concerns and ensure clarity, the prosecution 
should be held to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof with 
regard to the basic facts. 
188. Id. at 163. 
 189. The Court placed weight on several facts that made it unlikely the sixteen-year-old girl in 
whose purse the two handguns were found was the sole possessor of the guns. Id. at 163–64. For 
example, the Court noted that the “two guns were too large to be concealed in her handbag,” her 
handbag was open and part of one of the guns was in plain view, and as “a 16-year-old girl in the 
company of three adult men she was the least likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy 
handguns.” Id; see LaFave, supra note 147, § 3.4(b) (construing Allen to mean that, to test a 
permissive inference, the only necessary consideration is that there is a rational basis for a jury to infer 
one fact from another after considering “all the evidence in the particular case”). 
190. Allen, 442 U.S. at 166, 116 n.28. 
191. Id. at 166–67. 
192. Id. at 164–65. 
193. Graham, supra note 161, § 303:4 n.22. 
194. Id. 
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The procedural advantages of my presumption proposal for 
prosecuting elder financial exploitation would be twofold. In cases in 
which the state lacks specific proof of exploitation, whether due to the 
incapacity, death, or lack of cooperation of the elder victim, the 
presumption would allow the state to get past a motion of a directed 
verdict of acquittal at the close of the state’s case. Assuming the trial 
judge determined that the evidence—including the presumption of 
exploitation—was sufficient to allow reasonable jurors to conclude guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for directed verdict should be 
denied. To benefit from this bolstering effect of the presumption, the 
state would have to present evidence establishing the statutory basic facts 
in its case-in-chief. At the close of the evidence, the prosecution would 
then benefit from a jury instruction telling the jurors that, assuming they 
find the basic statutory facts to have been established, they could 
presume exploitation and consider the presumption in addition to all of 
the other evidence in deciding whether the defendant was guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
C. The Proposal 
With the above groundwork, this Article proposes state criminal 
statutes that create a permissive presumption of exploitation with respect 
to certain financial conveyances from elders. State laws for prosecuting 
elder financial exploitation vary widely.195 The goal of this Article is not to 
craft a one-size-fits-all piece of uniform legislation, but rather to set forth a 
conceptual legislative framework, using a detailed proposed permissive 
presumption statute as a tool, that could be fashioned by legislators in 
different states to fit within their existing legislative schemes. 
A state adopting this conceptual approach may want or need to alter 
some of the specifics of the proposed statute. Indeed, the nature of the 
presumption itself will vary depending on the individual state. My 
proposal would create a presumption of “exploitation” once the basic 
facts outlined in the statute have been established. Depending on the 
state’s legislative scheme for prosecuting elder financial exploitation, the 
presumption might be characterized instead as a presumption of undue 
influence, misrepresentation, fraud, theft, or lack of consent. Similarly, 
for reasons discussed in the analysis of the statutory component parts,196 
states may wish to amend some of the basic facts giving rise to the 
presumption. For the purposes of this Article, I included all the major 
provisions in a single statute, but separate definitional statutes defining 
key terms might be preferable for purposes of organizational clarity. 
 195. See generally Dessin, Is the Solution a Problem?, supra note 21 (analyzing the variety of state 
statutes used to address elder financial exploitation). 
196. See infra notes 211–256 and accompanying text. 
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1. Introduction to the Proposed Statute
The statute proposed here contains several basic or foundational 
facts that would have to be proved to give rise to the presumption of 
exploitation. Most statutory presumptions arise on proof of a single basic 
fact.197 The use of multiple basic facts is designed to increase the strength 
of the constitutionally required rational connection198 between the basic 
facts and the presumed fact of exploitation. 
Probabilistically, facts A + B + C + D + E are more likely to support 
X than simply A, then X. For example, the presumption in Allen, while 
upheld as constitutional, could be made more probabilistically reliable if 
the statute specified that a presumption of joint possession of a firearm in 
a vehicle arises from the fact of occupancy in the vehicle and being 
within the area of immediate dominion and control of the firearm: 
A (occupancy) + B (being within the area of control) warrant a stronger 
inference of X (joint possession) than would only A, then X. If we added 
C (the firearm was visible to the person), the presumption would be 
strengthened further. It would be difficult to construct a single basic fact, 
then exploitation presumption for elder financial exploitation crimes, in 
part due to the complexity of the crimes. 
Not all criminal presumptions are limited to proof of a single basic 
fact. For example, both federal199 and state200 extortionate credit statutes 
create a presumption of extortion in the event that the prosecution proves 
a combination of several basic facts. It is asserted that presumptions based 
on multiple basic facts should be less constitutionally suspect than those 
dependent on a single fact because the combination of facts is likely to 
increase the probability that the inferred fact is true.201 
197. See generally Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A Berger, 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence 
§ 303 app. 100(2) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2013) (listing federal criminal statutes that create
presumptions or inferences based on the proof of specified basic facts, most of which depend on proof 
of a single basic fact). 
 198. See supra notes 164–169 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s rational 
connection test for presumptions in criminal cases as originated in Tot v. United States). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b) (2013) (creating an inference of extortionate credit provided the following 
basic facts are established: (a) that the extension of credit was unenforceable by civil process; (b) that 
the extension of credit was made at a rate in excess of forty-five percent a year; (c) that the debtor 
reasonably believed that the creditor previously had collected extensions of credit by extortionate 
means or had the reputation of using extortionate means to collect; and (d) that the total of the 
extensions of credit by the creditor to the debtor exceeded one hundred dollars). 
 200. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2302(B) (2013) (creating an inference of extortionate credit 
provided the following basic facts are established: (a) that the repayment of the extension of credit would 
be unenforceable through civil judicial processes; (b) that the extension of credit was made at a rate of 
interest in excess of an annual rate of forty-five percent; (c) that the debtor reasonably believed that one 
or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected by extortionate means or that the creditor 
had a reputation of using extortionate means to collect extensions of credit; and (d) that the total of the 
extensions of credit outstanding exceeded one hundred dollars). 
 201. Some well-established civil law presumptions depend on the proof of multiple facts, such as 
the presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and deposited in a mail receptacle was 
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Summarized, my statutory proposal is that exploitation may be 
presumed if the following facts are proved: (a) an inter vivos transfer of 
money or property valued in excess of $1000; (b) by a person age sixty-
five or older; (c) to a non-relative; (d) whom the transferee has known 
fewer than two years before the first transfer; (e) for which the transferee 
did not receive reciprocal value in goods or services. Defenses would 
include valid charitable gifts and valid loans evidenced in writing with 
definite repayment dates and that are not in default. 
A presumption of exploitation in light of these facts would meet or 
exceed the “more likely than not” standard of proof established in Leary 
and reaffirmed in Allen with regard to the strength of the connection 
between the basic and presumed facts. This is particularly true in light of 
the Allen Court’s holding that permissive presumptions are to be analyzed 
as applied, not solely on their face, and will pass muster if all of the facts in 
evidence support the presumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.202 
Additional facts that are markers for exploitation, beyond the 
statutory basic facts in my proposal, are likely to be present in all elder 
financial exploitation cases and could be considered in determining the 
rational connection between the basic and presumed facts. For example, 
this Article has discussed how cognitive and physical impairments are 
often associated with elder fraud exploitation,203 as is living alone,204 
depression,205 and recent loss of a loved one.206 Proof of such facts could be 
considered by the fact finder in deciding whether to draw the presumption. 
The required rational connection between basic and presumed facts 
need be grounded only in common sense and experience.207 Presumptions 
are not required to be supported by empirical evidence or expert 
opinion. However, to the extent the inference is supported by valid 
scientific or empirical research, as several of the vulnerability and 
exploitation indicator factors discussed in Part I appear to be, expert 
testimony should be admissible to strengthen the presumption. 
delivered. See Evidence Law, supra note 140, § 4.08 (discussing this long-accepted common law 
presumption). This presumption depends on proof that: (1) the letter was in fact properly addressed; 
(2) that proper postage was affixed to it; and (3) that it was indeed deposited into a mail receptacle. 
202. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra notes 56–99 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
207. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1985) (“A permissive inference violates 
the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense 
justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.”); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 (1973) 
(upholding a jury instruction informing jurors that unexplained possession of recently stolen property 
supports a presumption that the defendant knew that the property was stolen because the presumption 
was grounded in “common sense and experience”); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467–68, 470–72 
(1943) (stating that a statutory presumption will be considered arbitrary and invalid unless the rational 
connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact is based in “common experience”). 
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2. The Proposed Statute
Here is the proposed statute: 
(1) Any inter vivos transfer of money or property valued in excess of 
$1,000 (one thousand dollars), whether in a single transaction or 
multiple transactions, by a person age 65 (sixty-five) or older to a non-
relative whom the transferor knew for fewer than two years before the 
first transfer and for which the transferor did not receive reciprocal 
value in goods or services shall create a permissive presumption that 
the transfer was the result of exploitation. 
(2) Subsection(1) shall apply regardless of whether the transfer or 
transfers are denoted by the parties as a gift or loan except that it shall 
not apply to a valid loan evidenced in a writing and which includes 
definite repayment dates; provided: in the event repayment of any such 
loan is in default, in whole or in part, for more than 60 (sixty) days, the 
presumption of subsection (1) shall apply. Subsection (1) does not 
apply to persons or entities that operate legitimate lending institutions. 
(3) This section does not apply to valid charitable donations to non-
profit organizations qualifying for tax exempt status under the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
(4) In a criminal case in which subsection (1) applies, jurors shall be 
instructed that they may, but are not required to, presume [or 
“infer”208] exploitation upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
facts listed in subsection (1).209 Jurors shall also be told that they may 
find a defendant guilty only if persuaded that each element of the 
offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.210 
3. Analysis of the Statutory Component Parts
a. Any Inter Vivos Transfer of $1000
The statute is intended to address all types of asset transfers with one 
exception: it is limited to inter vivos transfers and not intended to cover 
bequests by wills or trusts for which a large separate body of probate law 
exists addressing issues of undue influence.211 Inter vivos gifts or loans are 
present transfers involving active elder abuse, not events that need to be 
 208. Depending on state law, legislatures would have to consider whether to use the stronger word 
“presume” or the weaker word “infer” in the jury instruction. See, e.g., People v. Colantuono, 865 P. 2d 704, 
714 (Cal. 1994) (stating any reference to the word “presume” in jury instructions can be problematic). 
 209. While the issue is not free from doubt, the safest course would be to require that all basic facts 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a more likely than not standard because at least 
some of the basic facts are likely to be elemental facts (i.e., necessary to prove an element of the 
offense) under the state’s definition of the crime charged. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying 
text. This higher standard of proof should not be a substantial obstacle given that in most cases the 
basic facts outlined in the statute will be susceptible to objective proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 210. To the extent that this provision could be construed as an unwarranted intrusion by the 
legislature upon the judiciary, it might be preferable to leave this portion of the statute to the state 
body charged with crafting model jury instructions. 
 211. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 732.5165 (2013) (invalidating a will or gift procured by undue influence); 
Cal. Prob. Code § 6104 (West 2013) (same). 
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unraveled by the probate system, often years later, when the victim is 
deceased. Additionally, a layer of protection already exists with respect 
to wills and trusts because an attorney is usually involved in the drafting. 
Outright transfers, on the other hand, often occur without scrutiny.212 
Setting the threshold at $1000 is an admittedly arbitrary choice. The 
goal is to set a threshold sufficiently high so as to not include, even if only 
hypothetically, every financial gift from an elder, but low enough to 
capture perpetrators who perform “hit and run”-type cons on elders 
rather than long-term, continuing scams. I argue below that the error 
rate in applying the proposed presumption is likely to be extremely low. 
Nevertheless, if legislative drafters were concerned about 
unwarranted application of the presumption, the number could be raised. 
The higher the statutory monetary threshold, the stronger the inference 
that the victim would not, in the absence of exploitation, have transferred 
the assets without fair consideration. In 2014, the presumption proposed 
in this Article was introduced as a bill in the Florida Legislature as part 
of a broad package of elder protection laws.213 The bill made one 
substantive change in the proposal, which was to increase the triggering 
asset amount from $1000 to $10,000.214  
b. By a Person Age 65 or Older
Deciding exactly who should be protected by the presumption 
statute is tricky, both as a matter of probability of victimization and due 
to concerns about stereotyping or “ageism.” One commentator has 
 212. Another omission is fraudulent transfers of powers of attorney, which can be a significant 
source of elder abuse. See, e.g., Dana Shilling, License to Steal? The Uniform Power of Attorney Act 
and Other Tools to Fight Power of Attorney Abuse, 218 Elder L. Advisory, Apr. 2009, at 1–6 
(explaining the potential for elder exploitation in connection with powers of attorney and discussing 
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act); Irene D. Johnson, Preventing Identity Theft and Other Financial 
Abuses Perpetrated Against Vulnerable Members of Society: Keeping the Horse in the Barn Rather than 
Litigating Over the Cause and/or Consequences of His Leaving, 79 UMKC L. Rev. 99, 106–10 (2010) 
(discussing potential fraud against elders in connection with executing powers of attorney). Most 
powers of attorney granted by elders are to relatives and would be excluded from my proposal by its 
limitation to non-relatives. Interview with Lynda Wray Black, law professor and estate planning 
practitioner with more than twenty years of experience, in Memphis, Tenn. (Mar. 24, 2014). Although 
not addressed here, it should be feasible to include transfers of powers of attorney to non-relatives in 
an exploitation presumption statute under basic facts similar to those proposed herein. 
 213. H.B. 409, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014). As of March 24, 2014, the bill had passed 
unanimously through the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee, House Justice Appropriations 
Committee, and House Judiciary Committee. See Bill tracking for CS/CS/HB 409—Offenses Against 
Vulnerable Persons, Florida House of Representatives, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/ 
billsdetail.aspx?BillId=51542 (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (follow the respective “See Votes” hyperlinks 
for voting outcome in each committee). An identical companion bill has been introduced in the 
Florida Senate. S.B. 588, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014).  
 214. Fla. H.B. 409 § 4(2) (amending section 825.103 of Florida Statutes by setting forth the 
presumption of exploitation proposed in this Article, but raising the triggering asset amount from 
$1000 to $10,000). 
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criticized elder financial exploitation statutes that apply to persons based 
on their age as “ageist stereotyping” and asserted that elders need no 
special protection as a group,215 a dubious proposition in light of the 
occurrence rates for elder exploitation and the heightened risk for 
exploitation associated with aging. 
This Article opts for an age-based approach and the age of sixty-five 
as a triggering fact. Sixty and sixty-five are the most common statutorily 
specified ages in statutes protecting against elder exploitation.216 An 
argument for a higher age limit may exist in light of the studies cited in 
Part I showing that the “oldest old” are the most frequent targets of 
elder financial exploitation.217 It is difficult to get an accurate fix on the 
issue because of the underreporting problem.218 
Using a fixed age as a proxy for vulnerability to financial 
exploitation is imperfect, just as using fixed ages for laws that protect 
children, such as statutory rape laws or laws imposing a minimum age of 
consent for medical treatment,219 is imperfect. While not all elders suffer 
from cognitive impairment, substantial evidence discussed in Part I 
shows that older adults are frequently targeted for exploitation based on 
vulnerability factors associated with aging, including cognitive 
impairments.220 Part I discusses emerging research showing that brain 
changes in older adults may make them vulnerable to exploitation even 
when they appear to be of normal capacity.221 
Weakening any ageist criticism of an age-based proposal, whatever 
the age selected, is that the statute does not deprive elders of any rights 
or autonomy based on their age. The proposal would not, for example, 
invalidate qualifying financial transfers from an elder or impose 
guardianships or conservatorships on elders who give away their money.222 
 215. Dessin, Is the Solution a Problem?, supra note 21, at 292–303 (criticizing age-based elder 
protective legislation as insidious “ageist stereotyping” and asserting that “there seems no justifiable 
reason for protecting the older citizen simply because he is old”). 
216. See id. at 300. 
217. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra Part II (discussing the under-reporting of elder financial exploitation). 
219. See, e.g., Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful 
Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1205, 1225–30 
(1998) (critiquing the determination of consent in statutory rape cases based on fixed ages and 
discussing studies showing that many minors are capable of making competent decisions in several 
areas, including sexual contact and medical treatment). 
220. See supra Part I. 
221. See supra notes 72–106 and accompanying text. 
 222. Although not consequences of the proposal in this Article, both of these approaches are in 
use and warrant consideration as ways to bolster the protection of elders from financial predators. 
Maine has a statute that creates a rebuttable presumption of undue influence for any transfer by an 
elder of real estate or a major transfer of money or personal property for less than full consideration to 
a person with whom the elder has a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, 
§ 1022(1) (West 2013). If the transferee fails to rebut the presumption, the elder is entitled to the
transfer. Id. Some states also have provisions for emergency guardianships or court orders freezing 
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Rather, the presumption would come into play only in a criminal 
prosecution in which prosecutors and a reviewing judge have already 
made a determination that probable cause exists to believe that the 
defendant has financially exploited the elder victim. 
An alternative approach to relying on a fixed age as one of the basic 
facts would be to replace the language “by a person [of a specified age]” 
with a generic term such as “vulnerable adult.” Some states now use that 
term in place of or in addition to age-based provisions in their adult 
protection legislation. The definitions of vulnerable adult vary by state,223 
but generally speaking, apply to any person over the age of eighteen who 
suffers from an impairment that makes the person unable to provide for 
his or her own care.224 
While substituting a “vulnerable adult” test for an age-based 
provision might be a good policy choice in many contexts involving adult 
protective services, using the term in an exploitation presumption statute 
would weaken the effectiveness of the statute. On the surface, it would 
present an advantage in that proof that the victim was “vulnerable” 
within the statutory definition would strengthen the inferential 
connection between that basic fact and the presumed fact of exploitation. 
Certainly, standing alone, proving the victim was incapable of handling 
her own affairs would create a stronger inference of exploitation than 
simply proving that she was above a certain age.225 
But one of the primary purposes of presumptions is to make it easier 
to prove events that, although probable, remain difficult or impossible to 
prove without the presumption.226 Most familiar presumptions in the law 
assets in elder exploitation cases. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 2901 (West 2013) (providing for issuance 
by public guardians of certificates to financial institutions giving the public guardian immediate control 
over a suspected victim’s assets); see also Betty Malks et al., Combating Elder Financial Abuse—A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach to a Growing Problem, J. Elder Abuse & Neglect, July 2003, at 55, 61–64 
(describing effectiveness of quick-action multi-agency California elder financial protection task forces that 
use California Probate Code § 2901 to obtain immediate control over a suspected victim’s assets). 
 223. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.24.900(21) (West 2013) (defining “vulnerable adult” as “a 
person 18 years of age or older who, because of incapacity, mental illness, mental deficiency, physical 
illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, fraud, confinement, or 
disappearance, is unable to meet the person’s own needs or to seek help without assistance”); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 39-5302(10) (West 2013) (defining “vulnerable adult” as “a person eighteen (18) years of 
age or older who is unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or 
mental impairment which affects the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks 
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding his 
person”); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 14-101(q) (West 2013) (defining “vulnerable adult” as “an 
adult who lacks the physical or mental capacity to provide for the adult’s daily needs”). 
224. See id. 
 225. Of course, it is not argued that the basic fact of being age sixty-five or older is by itself 
sufficient to create a rational inference of exploitation, but only in combination with the other basic 
facts contained in the statute. 
226. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, § 343 (stating that presumptions are usually 
created based not only on a judicial estimate of probabilities, but “upon the difficulties inherent in 
proving that the more probable event in fact occurred”). 
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incorporate (more or less) bright-line basic facts as the predicate for the 
presumption, such as the presumption that a person missing for seven 
years is deceased and that a dated writing bears the accurate date. 
Making the exploitation presumption depend on proof of a mushy, 
potentially difficult-to-prove predicate fact of vulnerability, or some 
other lack of capacity, would reduce the usefulness of the presumption. 
“[O]ver age 65” (or whatever age a legislature decided to use) is a 
concrete, objectively provable fact. Of course, even under a fixed-age 
statute, proof of incapacity would be relevant and admissible and, under 
Allen, could be considered in assessing the strength of the rational 
connection between the basic facts and the presumed fact of exploitation. 
Also problematic with a generic “vulnerable adult” definition is that 
it may, depending on the wording, be insufficient to cover many elder 
victims who need protection. In general, states shifting to a “vulnerable 
adult” standard in statutes designed to protect elders should exercise 
care in crafting a definition that is not overly restrictive, unintentionally 
making it even more difficult to combat elder abuse and exploitation. 
As one example, Alaska defines vulnerable adult as “a person 18 
years of age or older who, because of incapacity, mental illness, mental 
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication, fraud, confinement, or disappearance, is unable to 
meet the person’s own needs or to seek help without assistance.”227 Such a 
definition is under-inclusive with respect to elder financial exploitation in 
that it would not apply to many elders who are able to meet their own 
needs and seek help without assistance but who are nevertheless 
susceptible to exploitation.228 The definition fails to recognize the sliding 
scale of incapacity with respect to cognitive impairments in elders229 and 
the research showing that elders who appear to have normal mental 
capacity can still be vulnerable to exploitation.230 Of course, nothing 
would prevent a state from using a “vulnerable adult” approach in the 
context of adult protective services generally while augmenting it with 
age-based statutes specifically directed at elder exploitation. 
c. To a Non-Relative
The restriction to non-relative exploiters is an unfortunate but 
necessary limitation to the legitimacy of the proposal. Sadly, a substantial 
percentage of elder financial fraud is committed by relatives.231 When that 
227. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.24.900(21). 
 228. The definition would not, for example, have included our father, who up until the day he died 
completely and insistently managed his life, including (unwisely and against advice) driving and 
running his own errands. 
229. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra notes 67–69, 72–99 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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happens, law enforcement should pursue and prosecute the perpetrators. 
However, given the unique, varied statuses and relationships of relatives, 
it would probably be impossible to craft a presumption statute that 
included them. Older relatives frequently make valid gifts or loans to 
relatives for no consideration. Thus, presuming that a financial transfer 
from an elder to a relative was the result of exploitation would not 
accord with common experience or probabilities. As a consequence, it 
most likely would be considered arbitrary and violate due process under 
the Tot-Leary-Allen line of cases. 
d. Whom the Transferor Knew for Fewer than Two Years
Before the First Transfer
Whereas elders frequently make financial gifts to relatives, they do 
not usually give money away to relative strangers. The shorter period of 
time that an elder has known the transferee, the stronger the inference 
that the transfer was the result of exploitation. 
Selecting a perfect “knowing” period is impossible given the 
vicissitudes of human interaction. On one end of the continuum, it is not 
uncommon for people to make gifts or valid loans, even large ones, to 
lifelong friends to whom they are not related. On the other end, common 
experience shows that people do not usually transfer large amounts of 
money or property for inadequate consideration to people that they have 
known for only a short time. While no empirical evidence exists, 
anecdotally, the cases and commentary encountered in researching this 
Article show that elder financial exploitation involving non-family 
members usually occurs, or begins, in situations where the elder knew 
the accused for only a short period.232 The shorter the statutory knowing-
period selected, the stronger the inference that exploitation occurred. 
Because elder financial exploitation schemes can continue for years, it 
is important that the statutory “knowing” period be triggered by the first 
transfer of money or property. In other words, the exploitation 
presumption would arise unless the accused knew the elder for a period of 
 232. Our father apparently knew the Defendant for less than a month before he began giving her 
thousands of dollars for her claimed medical treatment. The following colloquy occurred in his 
interview with the investigating detective: 
Q. Okay so you met her in March and shortly thereafter you gave her the money. 
A. Maybe I met her in February—it could be but . . . . 
Q. Okay. 
A. . . . the—the—the money started in . . . . 
Q. In March. 
A. . . . in—in—in March the first couple of weeks of March. 
Interview by Detective Edward Goldbach with Donald McClurg, supra note 46, at 10. 
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at least two years—or whatever period a legislature adopted—prior to any 
transfer of assets. 
e. For Which the Transferee Does Not Receive Reciprocal
Financial Value in Goods or Services
One of the clearest markers of elder financial exploitation, or fraud 
of any type, is when a person gets little or nothing in return for his or her 
asset transfers.233 Except with respect to valid charitable donations 
(covered below) and gifts to family, common experience informs us that 
people do not usually give away large sums of money or other assets 
without receiving goods or services of relatively equal value in return. 
f. Not Applicable to Valid Loans
As discussed throughout this Article, a primary obstacle to 
prosecuting elder financial exploitation and a primary reason for my 
proposal is the difficulty in proving that asset transfers superficially 
appearing to be gifts or loans were in fact the result of exploitation, undue 
influence, and/or psychological manipulation. Elder predators frequently 
seek to disguise exploitative transactions as legitimate ones. Thus, the 
presumption must apply regardless of how the parties characterize the 
transactions. 
An exception, however, is needed for valid loans.234 To be 
considered valid, the statute requires that the loan be evidenced in 
writing with definite repayment dates.235 In the event the loan goes into 
default for more than sixty days, the presumption would arise and apply. 
This is needed to prevent the perpetrator from simply disguising the 
transactions as loans while never intending to repay them. 
A potential question arises as to who would bear the burden of 
proof on the issue. Would the state have the burden of proving the 
conveyances were not valid loans or would it be proper to place the 
burden on the defendant to show they were valid loans? 
The “valid loan” exception would be in the nature of an affirmative 
defense that although courts and commentators have sometimes struggled 
to distinguish the two,236 differs from a burden-shifting presumption in 
 233. See, e.g., Lori A. Stiegel, Nat’l Acad. of Elder Law Att’ys, Inc., Financial Abuse: How It 
May Impact Your Clients and Your Practice 4 (2001) (asserting that not receiving services for 
which payment has been made is an indicator of financial exploitation). 
 234. An exemption for legitimate lending institutions is also included to reduce any concern that 
the presumption could be applied to such an entity. 
 235. Cf. Hafemeister, supra note 6, at 396 (noting that financial exploitation may be indicated by 
the lack of proper documentation for financial transactions and arrangements). 
 236. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, § 346 (stating that “the courts and writers have 
struggled to define and distinguish presumptions and affirmative defenses”). 
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that the burden placed on the defendant by an affirmative defense is 
established at the outset based on existing statutory or case law.237  
In a line of cases culminating with Patterson v. New York,238 the 
Supreme Court established the constitutional doctrine regarding burdens 
of proof and affirmative defenses in criminal cases. Early on, in Leland v. 
Oregon,239 the Court held that a defendant raising a defense of insanity 
could properly be required to prove insanity at the time of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.240 Three decades later, in Mullaney v. 
Wilbur,241 the Court suggested that the prosecution may have the burden 
of persuasion as a matter of due process with regard to affirmative 
defenses,242 calling the continued viability of Leland into question. 
In Patterson, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder 
after shooting a man in the company of his estranged wife.243 A New 
York statute furnished an affirmative defense if the defendant “acted 
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or excuse.”244 In accordance with New 
York law, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant bore the 
burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.245 In 
response to a challenge that placing such a burden on the defendant 
violated due process, the Court held that once the state proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the facts constituting the elements of the crime, it could 
refuse to sustain an affirmative defense unless supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.246 
Thus, it appears the state could properly require a defendant who 
raises a “valid loan” defense to bear even the burden of persuasion on 
that issue by a preponderance of the evidence. In any event, there would 
be no problem requiring the defendant to bear the burden of production 
on the issue. McCormick observes and cites support for the proposition 
that courts “have had no trouble” with affirmative defenses that require 
237. Id. 
238. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
239. 343 U.S. 790 (1952). 
240. Id. at 798–800. 
241. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
242. Id. at 704. In Mullaney, the jury was instructed that if the prosecution proved an intentional, 
unlawful homicide, malice aforethought was presumed unless the defendant proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was acting in the heat of passion. Id. at 686. On certiorari, the 
Court held that placing the burden on the defendant ran contrary to In re Winship and violated due 
process, thereby creating grounds for reversal of the conviction. Id. at 703–04. 
243. 432 U.S. at 198. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 200. 
246. Id. at 206. The Court stated: “We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, 
operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting 
any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.” Id. at 210. 
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defendants to bear only a burden of production.247 LaFave makes a 
similar observation.248 To reduce any potential for confusion on the issue, 
it might be desirable to add a clear statement in the statute that the valid 
loan exception is an “affirmative defense.”249 
g. Not Applicable to Valid Charitable Donations
Similar to the exemption for valid loans, an exception is required for 
valid charitable contributions. The analysis of this exception in terms of 
the burden of proof would track that for valid loans above; that is, a 
defendant claiming that assets transferred from the victim constituted a 
valid charitable donation could properly be made to bear the burden of 
proof on that issue. 
h. Jury Instructions
This final provision makes it clear that the presumption created by 
the statute is a permissive one that does not shift the burden of proof, 
either the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant, assuring 
that the presumption would pass constitutional scrutiny. 
States should create a model jury instruction to accompany the 
statute. An instruction capturing the gist of what should be conveyed to 
the jury could read similarly to this:250 
There is in effect in the state of X a statute that allows a presumption 
of financial exploitation to be drawn if you find the prosecution has 
proved the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the 
defendant received money or property from [name of victim] valued in 
excess of $1000; (2) that [name of victim] is a person age sixty-five or 
older; (3) that the defendant is not a relative of [name of victim]; 
(4) that [name of victim] knew the defendant for fewer than two years 
prior to the first transfer of money or property; and (5) that [name of 
victim] did not receive reciprocal value in goods or services for the 
transfer of money or property. 
If you find the prosecution has proved these facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you may but are not required to presume that the transfer or 
transfers were the result of exploitation. 
Even if you make this presumption, however, you may find the 
defendant guilty only if you are convinced that the state has proved the 
247. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 139, § 347. 
 248. LaFave, supra note 147, § 3.4(f) (“Sometimes claims of exemption from a statutory prohibition 
are based upon some proviso or exception appearing in the statute, in which case courts frequently hold 
that the burden of coming forward with proof of the exculpatory fact is on the defendant.”). 
249. This approach might also be desirable with respect to the charitable gift exception. 
250. As with the proposed statute itself, the wording of the instruction would vary depending on 
the nature and wording of the state’s elder financial exploitation statutes. 
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guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as that term is 
defined in these instructions.251 
In cases where the defendant asserts the transfers were valid loans or 
charitable gifts, a separate instruction would be required on those points. 
An error rate, of course, is present in all presumptions. Not every 
person missing for seven years is deceased, not every dated document 
bears the correct date, and not everyone in every vehicle containing a 
firearm jointly possesses the firearm.252 Can one hypothesize financial 
transfers that would meet the basic facts of the proposed statute but 
which would be legitimate gifts or loans not the result of exploitation? Of 
course, just as the Court of Appeals in Allen was able to hypothesize 
situations where it would be arbitrary to presume that a firearm found in 
a motor vehicle was jointly possessed by all of the occupants, such as 
where a hitchhiker is riding in a car with a small handgun hidden under 
the seat or in the glove compartment.253 The Allen majority rejected the 
appellate court’s hypotheticals as “implausible,”254 but more importantly, 
the Court indicated that imagining improbable situations to which a 
presumption would be wrongly applied is not the proper mode of 
analysis.255 
With respect to the proposal herein, two important error-avoidance 
mechanisms would work to minimize, if not eliminate, unwarranted 
applications of the presumption as a practical matter. First, just as the 
Supreme Court responded to the Court of Appeals’ hitchhiker example 
in Allen by observing the unlikelihood that such a prosecution ever 
would be pursued, legitimate financial transfers from elders will be 
unlikely to result in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, as explained in 
 251. Such an instruction would roughly track subsection (c) of rejected Federal Rule of 
Evidence 303, which reads: 
(c) Instructing the Jury. Whenever the existence of presumed fact against the accused is 
submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury 
may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it 
to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or 
negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the 
evidence, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Proposed Rule 303, Fed. R. Evid., in Steven Goode & Olin Guy Wellborn, Courtroom 
Evidence Handbook: 2013–2014 Student Edition 70 (2013). Rule 303 first surfaced in a 
preliminary form in 1969 and progressed in fits and starts along a torturous, controversial route 
until it evolved into its present form, which was never enacted by Congress. See 21B Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. Evid., supra note 147, § 5141 (describing in detail the excruciating history of Rule 303). 
Today the rule is referred to as “Standard 303” and considered to be “useful as a statement of 
existing law.” Graham, supra note 161, § 303.4. 
252. See Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 164–65 (1979). 
253. Id. at 147 n.4 (1979) (discussing appellate court’s hypotheticals). 
254. Id. at 155–56 n.14. 
255. The Court said the appellate court’s examples were “unconvincing even were that type of 
analysis appropriate,” and in the next sentence said it “has never required that a presumption be 
accurate in every imaginable case.” Id. 
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Part II, it is rare even for transfers that are clearly the result of 
exploitation to be prosecuted,256 which is a primary reason for the 
presumption proposal. Second, in the remarkable event that the statute 
was applied in a case involving a purely innocent recipient of an elder’s 
gift that met the statutory basic facts, the possibility of conviction would 
be almost nonexistent. 
Suppose, hypothetically, a young low-income couple moves in next 
door to an elder who has substantial financial resources. The couple 
befriends the elder. They help her when she needs assistance and she 
appreciates it. An event occurs in the lives of the couple that puts them 
in dire straits and requires financial resources to resolve. The elder gives 
or loans the couple $2000 to address the issue. 
It is improbable that such a transaction would lead to a criminal 
complaint and implausible that it could result in an arrest and conviction. 
If a complaint was made a quick investigation would result in a decision 
not to pursue the matter. If the complaint was pursued and resulted in a 
criminal prosecution, it is hard to imagine, absent other facts, jurors 
drawing the instructed inference of exploitation or returning a guilty 
verdict under these facts, especially since they would be told in clear 
terms that the presumption is permissive and that they could convict only 
if all of the evidence showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
rationality of the jurors was corrupted in some way, the conviction would 
not stand due to insufficient evidence. 
In summary, this statutory presumption proposal is needed for both 
practical and policy reasons, is constitutionally sound, and would help 
law enforcement prosecute those who prey on vulnerable elders, with 
minimal chances of endangering the innocent. 
Conclusion 
“I ask what will be the result of today’s hearing. Others and I have 
been forced to settle with disappointment in the last 5 years. I often 
wonder if this will be another disappointment, and I will anxiously 
await the results.”257 
The quotation above came from a witness testifying in 2002 before a 
Special U.S. Senate Committee on Aging investigating financial elder 
exploitation. The accurate, disappointing answer to the witness’s question 
about what would be the result of the hearing is, more than a decade later, 
“not much.” Elder abuse of all types is common. This Article has focused 
on financial exploitation, showing that it is widespread and increasing and 
that instances of elder financial exploitation are notoriously underreported 
256. See supra notes 115–133 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Schemer, Scammers & Sweetheart Deals Hearing, supra note 44, 20 (2002) (reproducing a 
comment from William Blevins, testifying about the financial exploitation of his elderly cousin). 
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and under-prosecuted. Nevertheless, little has been or is being done to 
improve the situation. 
We need more information and understanding of the scope and 
nature of elder abuse issues and in that regard the Elder Justice Act of 
2010, devoted largely to studying the problem, was a good step.258 As with 
many pervasive social ills, one large obstacle is a lack of resources. 
Experts agree that we need more and better trained people in just about 
every relevant area and at every level, including adult protective services, 
law enforcement, healthcare, and consumer protection to name a few. 
The numerous agencies charged with protecting elders must coordinate 
better.259 The multifaceted nature of the issues requires multidisciplinary 
approaches, which have proven successful when implemented.260 
But the resource issue is not going to go away and elders cannot 
wait another ten years while the federal government, academics, or 
others study the issue. Action is needed now. 
One direct preventative measure would be universal mandatory 
reporting laws, requiring financial institutions to report to law 
enforcement elder fraud that they reasonably suspect. Most states have 
some type of elder abuse reporting statutes261 and approximately half of 
states have mandatory reporting laws applicable to financial 
institutions.262 Financial institutions are often in the best, most efficient 
position to detect and disrupt elder financial abuse because of their 
existing duties and safeguards to protect customers’ assets, sophisticated 
technology for identifying patterns of fraud, and ability to train 
employees to spot exploitation.263 Ideally, all fifty states would require 
mandatory reporting by financial institutions and, importantly, back up 
the duty with meaningful sanctions for failure to comply.264 Other 
258. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Elder Justice Act of 2010). 
 259. See Nerenberg, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that during roundtable discussions, federal 
agencies sharing responsibility for protecting elders cited as primary challenges the number of 
agencies involved and the lack of clarity in their roles and jurisdiction). 
260. See Malks et al., supra note 222, at 56 (describing the Financial Abuse Specialist Team 
protocol in Santa Clara County, CA, a collaboration among four agencies to combat elder financial 
exploitation, and asserting that the Financial Abuse Specialist Team prevented or recovered more 
than $100 million in losses to elders from fraud). 
 261. Lori Stiegel & Ellen Klem, ABA Comm’n on Law & Aging, Reporting Requirements: 
Provisions and Citations in Adult Protective Services Laws, by State (2007) (organizing elder 
abuse reporting statutes by state). 
 262. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-208, Special Committee on Aging: Stronger 
Federal Leadership Could Enhance National Response to Elder Abuse 41–42 (2011) (listing 
twenty-four states that require financial institutions to report elder abuse). 
 263. BITS, BITS Fraud Protection Toolkit: Protecting the Elderly and Vulnerable from 
Financial Fraud and Exploitation 6 (2010) (explaining how financial institutions are in a unique 
position to detect elder fraud). 
 264. Some financial institution elder exploitation reporting statutes do include sanctions, but they 
are weak and sometimes apply only to willful violations. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 
§ 15630.1(f) (West 2012) (providing that failure by a financial institution to report elder financial
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potential preventative measures include creating a registry of convicted 
elder predators, and enacting efficient procedures that allow law 
enforcement and adult protective services to quickly freeze the assets of 
suspected victims pending investigation. 
This Article has concentrated on facilitating the prosecution of 
offenders after they are identified. Absent a meaningful threat of 
criminal prosecution, inadequate deterrence to the crime exists. Also, 
allowing elder predators to escape prosecution enables them to more 
easily commit similar crimes against others. 
As explained, a principal obstacle to both initiating and successfully 
completing criminal prosecutions is the difficulty of proving that asset 
transfers from an elder to an exploiter were the result of exploitation 
rather than consensual loans or gifts, even in circumstances that raise a 
strong inference of exploitation. The permissive statutory presumption 
proposal in this Article would provide a tool to assist prosecutors in 
scaling that hurdle.265 As detailed in Part III, such a presumption would 
be workable and constitutional. 
Society is failing to protect one of our most precious and vulnerable 
resources from exploitation: the elders who nurtured, clothed, fed, 
taught, and raised us all. We cannot ignore them as “used up” or 
unneeded. We owe them all that we are. Not abandoning our elders to 
financial or other predators is a moral imperative. While much needs to 
be done, the statutory presumption proposal herein constitutes a 
feasible, economical, constitutional, available, and concrete step toward 
both providing justice for individual victims and deterring exploitation 
before it happens. 
exploitation can result in a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars and that willful failure to 
report can result in a penalty not exceeding five thousand dollars); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6.5-
108(1)(c) (West 2013) (stating that a person who willfully violates the elder abuse reporting statute, 
which includes financial institutions within its scope, commits a Class 3 misdemeanor). The tort 
doctrine of negligence per se for statutory violations would arguably apply to facilitate civil liability of 
financial institutions for negligent breaches of statutory reporting duties. Elders are within the class of 
persons intended to be protected by such statutes and financial fraud is the kind of harm that the 
statutes are intended to prevent. 
 265. Other law enforcement tools are also needed, such as enhanced penalties for elder predation 
and an elder hearsay exception that would allow reliable out-of-court statements made by elders, such 
as sworn, recorded statements to law enforcement authorities, to be admitted as evidence if the elder 
dies or becomes incapacitated prior to trial. See Teresa B. Watson, Note, Combating Crime Against the 
Elderly: Does the Public Interest Warrant a Special Hearsay Exception?, 32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 585, 
594 (2009) (asserting that “a special hearsay exception may be the most effective way to facilitate 
successful prosecution” of elder crimes). An elder hearsay exception, however, might not survive 
constitutional challenge. See Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 960 (Fla. 1999) (striking down Florida’s 
hearsay exception for elders and disabled adults as violative of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause despite the fact that the court previously upheld a similar hearsay exception for children under 
age eleven). The presumption proposal herein would help compensate for the lack of a elder hearsay 
exception by enabling prosecutions to proceed in many cases despite the unavailability of the victim 
due to death, incapacity, or unwillingness to cooperate. 
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